dissent">LANSING, Judge

(dissenting).

I join in the dissent of Judge Sedgwick. A primary purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to insure that searches and seizures are screened in advance by a neutral and detached magistrate. Facts are essential for this screening and are a precondition for the issuance of a warrant. Although the quantum and type of evidence must be evaluated under the totality of the circumstances to insure that the probable cause is sufficient, the existence of probable cause must first be guaranteed by the presentation of facts. In this case, there are no facts on the crucial issue of reliability of the informant.

We cannot confer unbridled discretion in the individual police officer to conduct searches. The police officer must state a factual basis for the search under oath rather than merely assert in conclusory terms that an informant is “credible” or “reliable” or has been used “successfully.” Allowing police to make their own conclusions about reliability can support well-intentioned but unsubstantiated searches. This procedure can equally support willful police misconduct. As Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court in Illinois v. Gates, — U.S.—, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983):

An affidavit must provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause * * *. An officer’s statement that “affiants have received reliable information from a credible person and believe” that heroin is stored in a home, is likewise inadequate. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964). * ⅜ [T]his is a mere conclusory statement that gives the magistrate virtually no basis at all for making a judgment regarding probable cause. Sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to allow that official to determine probable cause; his action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others. In order to ensure that such an abdication of the magistrate’s duty does not occur, courts must continue to conscientiously review the sufficiency of affidavits on which warrants are issued.

I am also not persuaded that the corroboration in this case is sufficient to establish the informant’s reliability. In State v. Wiberg, 296 N.W.2d 388 (Minn.1980), the Court held that police corroboration of a key detail of an informant’s statement gave credence to the remaining portions of the statement. The Court went on to find that the informant’s declaration against penal interest coupled with the police officer’s purchase from the informant of one of the stolen weapons was sufficient to support the informant’s credibility. In contrast, the corroboration in this case is limited to the officer’s independent verification that a woman named Clare lived at the address given by the informant and that a car registered to her was parked in front of the residence. This is corroboration of innocent activity, not corroboration of a key detail of the informant’s statement. The corroboration here was not remotely suspicious of criminal activity.

For these reasons, I dissent.

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