349 F. Supp. 2d 190 - Mullane v. Chambers’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 5 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Chambers could reasonably have assumed that the Murphys themselves changed the name. Furthermore, the name change appears even less suspicious when viewed in the context of the surrounding events. Despite ample opportunity at the time of the levy, the Murphys never even mentioned the Mullanes as possible owners of the vessel. Any vague suspicions regarding the ownership of the vessel would have been ■wiped away by the Coast Guard’s confirmation at the time of the levy that the Murphys were the recorded owners of the vessel and by the fact that the Murphys were living on the vessel with then-pets and personal belongings when the Sheriffs Department arrived to seize the vessel. With regard to the discharge of the mortgage, the [cjourt makes two observations. First, the discharge of a preferred ship’s mortgage in the amount of $100,095 to Eastern Bank, dated July 17, 1998, did not contain the name of anyone other than the Murphys. That document alone would not necessarily lead one to suspect that it was Mullane who discharged the mortgage. In fact, Tabit presumed that the Murphys had paid off the mortgage themselves and now had sufficient equity in the vessel to satisfy his clients’ judgments. Second, and most importantly, even if the Eastern Bank receipt qualified as actual notice of the sale to Mullane, the Mullanes have failed to prove by a reasonable preponderance of the evidence that such notice was attained before or at the time of the levy. On May 27, 2004, the [c]ourt he”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 973 F. Supp. 2d 820 - Martin v. Performance Boat Brokerage.com, LLC

2. “If a person has knowledge of such facts as would lead a fair and prudent man, using ordinary thoughtfulness and care, to make further accessible inquiries, and he avoids the inquiry, he is chargeable with the knowledge which by ordinary diligence he would have acquired. Knowledge of facts, which, to the mind of a man of ordinary prudence, beget inquiry, is actual notice, or, in other words, is the knowledge which a reasonable investigation would have revealed.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. SMS Financial JDC, LP v. Cope

3. “reimburse the Mullanes for all reasonable storage and insurance costs of the vessel incurred since the levy.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Mullane