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349 Ill. App. 3d 391

811 N.E.2d 708

285 Ill.Dec. 221

People v. Lemke

Appellate Court of Illinois

Decided April 20, 2004

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Appellate Court of Illinois · decided 2004-04-20

Relies on 162 Ill. 2d 224 - People v. Brocksmith

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2004-04-20

How this case has been cited

Cited by 27 later decisions — most recently February 2026 · most notably 358 Ill. App. 3d 683 - People v. Moore (2005), 378 Ill. App. 3d 580 - People v. Walton (2007)

27 state decisions

150200420102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

JUSTICE KUEHN,

¶1specially concurring:

¶2I concur in the majority opinion. I write separately to underscore the absence of a strategy that can be deemed sound and to emphasize the importance of making a record when counsel pursues a course that touches upon a decision that only the defendant can make.

¶3Whether or not a lesser-included offense is submitted for decision is a defendant’s call. People v. Brocksmith, 162 Ill. 2d 224, 229-30, 642 N.E.2d 1230, 1233 (1994). Thus, when the evidence would support the submission of lesser-included offenses for consideration yet an all-or-nothing strategy is pursued, it would seem to be good practice to make a record of the defendant’s desire to forego decision on any of the lesser-included offenses. This is particularly so when the charge is first-degree murder and the evidence will support a finding of involuntary manslaughter. The dissipation of criminal culpability, and its attendant punishments, is nowhere greater than when dealing with a homicide committed recklessly, as opposed to being committed with knowledge that death or great bodily harm will ensue from certain acts.

¶4When defense counsel tenders a defense that, if believed, constitutes involuntary manslaughter, counsel fails to provide the kind of representation that the constitution contemplates, if he fails to make involuntary manslaughter a potential outcome, tendered for decision. This is even more the case when the decision is left to a judge, schooled in the law. Presumably, a judge would know that what the defendant claimed to have occurred, as a matter of law, constitutes a crime.

¶5The defendant’s version of what happened simply does not absolve him of criminal responsibility. Thus, the tendered defense left the judge with a certain decision, uncluttered by the possibility that the defendant committed involuntary manslaughter, recklessly disregarding a substantial risk of harm by introducing a loaded gun into the affray, a gun that he very well may have discharged accidently, rather than intentionally. The judge had no alternative but to convict the defendant of first-degree murder. On remand, the trier of fact will have the opportunity to find the defendant guilty of the crime that he claims to have committed.

¶6For the reasons stated, I respectfully concur.

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