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349 So. 2d 806

Docket No. 77-1209.

State Ex Rel. Dean v. Booth

STATE of Florida ex rel. Wayne P. DEAN, Jr., Relator, v. The Honorable John W. BOOTH, Judge Circuit Court, Fifth Judicial Circuit of Florida, Respondent.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided September 9, 1977.

Rehearing Denied October 6, 1977.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1977-09-09

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“was taken to the jail and held for a short period for investigation with no charge for the murder being on file. He was then released without a charge being filed. His subsequent arrest on March 26 was on an unrelated charge upon which he was held until an indictment was returned against him on September 16 for murder. Under these circumstances, the time within which he could be tried under the speedy trial rule began to run to September 16, 1975.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Snow v. State

“within the meaning of the speedy trial rule. We feel he was not. When an accused is stopped and temporarily detained, but is not placed in a cell or fingerprinted, and is allowed to leave without being placed under arrest, he has not been placed”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 359 So. 2d 39 - State v. Robbins

Relies on 346 So. 2d 546 - Snead v. State · 338 So. 2d 1141 - Deloach v. State · 276 So. 2d 523 - Sibert v. Hare

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1977-09-09

How this case has been cited

Cited by 20 later decisions — most recently August 2018

20 state decisions

14019771980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Kirk N. Kirkconnell of Muller & Kirkconnell, P.A., Winter Park, for relator.

¶2Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Robert J. Landry, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for respondent.

¶3

*807 ON SUGGESTION FOR PROHIBITION

¶4GRIMES, Acting Chief Judge.

¶5On January 6, 1977, the police responded to a report of a burglary and a shooting. At the scene, the police found a victim who was lying on the ground with a leg wound, a witness who told the police that the relator had shot the victim, and the relator who had a gun stuck in his belt. Relator lived at the scene of the shooting, and the victim was suspected of having committed the burglary.

¶6The police placed the relator in the patrol car. The officer first locked him in but later locked the car so it could not be entered from outside because relator expressed fear for his safety at the hands of several onlookers. The relator was driven to the police station for questioning. At the station, the police advised the relator of his Miranda rights and obtained a statement from him. He was not placed in a cell, nor was he fingerprinted. The relator was then allowed to leave without being placed under arrest.

¶7On March 14, 1977, the relator was indicted for aggravated battery in violation of Section 784.045(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1975). Immediately after being indicted, the relator was arrested.

¶8On July 6, 1977, the relator moved for discharge pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191 on the ground that more than 180 days had passed since January 6, 1977, when the relator had been taken into custody for the criminal episode giving rise to the crime charged. The motion was denied.

¶9The relator has now filed in this court a suggestion for writ of prohibition seeking to prevent his trial on the aggravated battery charge. If the speedy trial time has run, prohibition is a proper remedy. Sibert v. Hare,276 So.2d 523 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973).

¶10When the police initially questioned the relator at the station, he was "in custody" for purposes of being entitled to Miranda warnings. However, we do not believe he was "in custody" within the meaning of Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(a)(1). A short protective or investigative custody is often advisable where, as in the instant case, a person is a suspect but the police do not believe they have enough evidence to arrest him. Here, there was some evidence that the relator had acted in self-defense. After questioning, the relator was permitted to leave the station without restraint. To construe the speedy trial rule to mean that the time starts running every time the police take a suspect to the station for questioning could have a deleterious effect because the police might then feel compelled to make an arrest on less than sufficient evidence in order to activate the wheels of the prosecutorial process before the time runs out.

¶11Our case is somewhat like Snead v. State,346 So.2d 546 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), in which the court said:

"... [A]ppellant was taken to the jail and held for a short period for investigation with no charge for the murder being on file. He was then released without a charge being filed. His subsequent arrest on March 26 was on an unrelated charge upon which he was held until an indictment was returned against him on September 16 for murder. Under these circumstances, the time within which he could be tried under the speedy trial rule began to run on September 16, 1975."

¶12The relator's reliance on Deloach v. State,338 So.2d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), is misplaced because there the defendant was formally placed under arrest on the date the speedy trial time was deemed to have commenced running.

¶13The suggestion for writ of prohibition is denied.

¶14SCHEB and OTT, JJ., concur.

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