Williams v. Georgia’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

105 federal appellate · 18 district · 60 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 311 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “A state procedural rule which forbids the raising of federal questions at late stages in the case, or by any other than a prescribed method, has been recognized as a valid exercise of state power. . . . But, where a State allows questions of this sort to be raised at a late stage and be determined by its courts as a matter of discretion, we are not concluded from assuming jurisdiction and deciding whether the state court action in the particular circumstances is, in effect, an avoidance of the federal right. A state court may not, in the exercise of its discretion, decline to entertain a constitutional claim while passing upon kindred issues raised in the same manner.”

   6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In re Kravitz · Magruder v. Com.

2. ““ * * * That life is at stake is of course another important factor in creating the extraordinary situation. The difference between capital and non-capital offenses is the basis of differentiation in law in diverse ways in which the distinction becomes relevant. We think that orderly procedure requires a remand to the State Supreme Court for reconsideration of the case. Fair regard for the principles which the Georgia courts have enforced in numerous cases and for the constitutional commands binding on all courts compels us to reject the assumption that the courts of Georgia would allow this man to go to his death as the result of a conviction secured from a jury which the State admits was unconstitutionally impaneled. Cf. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 [ 55 S.Ct. 340 , 79 L.Ed. 791 ].” 349 U.S. at 390-391 , 75 S.Ct. at 823-824 .”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Barefoot v. Estelle · Brown v. Brough

3. “In response to a questionnaire prepared by the Journal and sent to 100 southern lawyers whose names were picked at random, 20 stated that they felt the Fifth Circuit was correct in taking judicial notice that lawyers in the South rarely raise the issue of jury exclusion. Fourteen felt the Fifteen Circuit was incorrect either because there is no jury exclusion (9) or because the issue is raised when the facts so warrant (5). "In answer to the question whether you would `raise at trial level the issue of systematic exclusion of Negroes from the jury, if you thought there was reasonable evidence of such exclusion,' 21 answered yes and 13 responded no. "Reasons given for the failure to raise the objection included a desire not to prejudice the lawer's position in the community (2), a desire not to prejudice the client's interests by stirring up community feeling against him, thereby hoping to achieve the best result for the Negro client (11), and a feeling that it would make no difference to the outcome of the case whether or not there is jury exclusion (15). "In response to the questionnaire prepared by the Journal, one Alabama lawyer wrote: "`If I accepted a Negro for jury duty and put him on with 11 white men I would prejudice the white men against me and my client.' "A lawyer in Florida wrote: "`It has been my observation and it is my present thinking that the interests of a Negro client in the South would be better protected by the white man than colored.'”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Whitus v. Balkcom