Mott v. Commissioner’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 18 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “From a consideration of the above cases it seems to us sound to conclude that the Uniform Stock Transfer Act is not intended to prescribe an exclusive method for transferring property in shares of stock and that the question of when the property passes may be determined under the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act (Sale of Goods Act). The courts of Michigan do not appear to have passed on this question, although it has been held in that State that corporate stock is “goods” within the statute of frauds. Sprague v. Hosie, 155 Mich. 30 ; 118 N. W. 497 . Under the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act quoted above it is not necessary that the goods be actually delivered in order to have a completed sale. The time of passing of title, and completion of sale, of specific or ascertained goods depends on the intent of the parties to the contract. * * *”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Pulfer v. Commissioner

2. “Our conclusion here need not rest on our interpretation of the Uniform Acts. These acts can not control the matter of deductions under a Federal revenue act. Deductions for losses, like those for depletion, Palmer v. Bender, 287 U. S. 551 , and depreciation, Weiss v. Wiener, 279 U. S. 333 , are determinable by the Federal statute. “State law may control only when the operation of the Federal taxing act by express language or necessary implication makes its own operation dependent on state law.” Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U. S. 103 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Pulfer v. Commissioner

3. “* * * Here the petitioner owned the shares and they were within her control and available for delivery. She intended to sell the shares that she owned, and it is stipulated that they were sold. Mere failure to deliver certificates is not alone enough to establish a short sale. * * * [P. 197.] * * * The petitioner intended to sell in 1930 specific shares then available for delivery and the broker intended to sell those shares. And, as said in the JPerree case, the Sales Act allows delay in delivery. [P. 201.]”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Wilson v. Commissioner