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35 F. 14

Campbell v. City of New York

United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York

Decided May 22, 1888.)

United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York · decided 1888-05-22

<p>Equity—Pleading—Supplemental Bill.</p> <p>Where the complainant in an original bill has, since bringing the suit, parted with his whole interest in the subject-matter, and those for whom he was trustee have transferred their whole interest in the subject-matter to A, and the title to any sum of money which may be recovered in the suit has by these transfers become vested in A., the remedy of A. is by an original bill in the nature of a supplemental bill, and not by a supplemental bill.</p>

3 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““Although the distinction between- supplemental bills and original bills seems to rest upon purely artificial reasons, it is well recognized, and is attended in practice with consequences which affect the substantial rights of parties. If the cestuis que trustent had not transferred all their interest in the subject-matter, and there had: been simply a change of trustees by operation of law, or if there had been only a partial alienation of the title of Campbell, a supplemental bill might lie. As it is, the demurrer must he sustained.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including Curtis Davis & Co. v. Smith

““The principle is elementary that a complainant, suing in his own right and alone, cannot, after he has parted with his whole interest in the subject-matter of the litigation, further prosecute the action.”.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Pittsburgh, S. & N. R. v. Fiske

Relies on Campbell v. Mayor of New York

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1888-05-22

How this case has been cited

Cited by 7 later decisions — most recently February 1910

2 federal appellate ·

401888189019001910decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1Equity—Pleading—Supplemental Bill.

¶2Where the complainant in an original bill has, since bringing the suit, parted with his whole interest in the subject-matter, and those for whom he was trustee have transferred their whole interest in the subject-matter to A, and the title to any sum of money which may be recovered in the suit has by these transfers become vested in A., the remedy of A. is by an original bill in the nature of a supplemental bill, and not by a supplemental bill.

¶3In Equity. On demurrer to supplemental bill. For hearing on pleas to supplemental bill, see 33 Fed. Rep. 795.

¶4James B. Lockwood, (Marcus P. Norton, of counsel,) for complainant.

¶5Henry D. Hadlock, for Philbrook.

¶6George Bliss and Sherman M. Rogers, for Green and Murphy.

¶7Wallace, J.

¶8The theory upon which this supplemental bill proceeds

¶9is that Campbell, the complainant in the original bill, since bringing the suit, has parted with his whole interest in the subject-matter, and that those for whom Campbell was trustee have transferred their whole interest in the subject-matter to Philbrook, or to Philbrook and Knibbs, and that'the title to any sum of money which may be recovered in the suit has by these transfers become vested in Philbrook, or in Philbrook and Knibbs. Upon such a state of facts the remedy of Philbrook is by an original bill in the nature of a supplemental bill, and not by a supplemental bill. This was distinctly stated in the opinion announced upon the hearing of the motion in which Philbrook applied for leave to be made a co-complainant. Although the distinction between supplemental bills and original bills seems to rest upon purely artificial reasons, it is well recognized, and is attended in practice with consequences which affect .the substantial rights of .parties. If the cesiuis que trust had not transferred all their interest in the subject-matter, and there had been simply a change of trustees by operation at law, or if there had been only a 'partial alienation of the title of Campbell, a supplemental bill might lie. As it is, the demurrer must be sustained. Mitf. Eq. PI. 85, 98; 1 Barb. Ch. Pr. 66, 84; Story, Eq. PI. 349; Tappan v. Smith, 5 Bis. 73. The third ground of objection assigned in the demurrer sufficiently raises the point.

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