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← 35 F.3d 155 - Stroik v. Ponseti

Stroik v. Ponseti’s Empirical Analysis

35 F.3d 155 · 1994

Citation profile

27
cited by 27 later decisions
3
states following
November 2019
most recently cited

8 federal appellate · 1 district · 6 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 27 later decisions — most recently November 2019 · most notably Hathaway v. Bazany (2007), Petta v. Rivera (1998)

8 federal appellate · 1 district · 6 state decisions

140199420002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 636 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Terry v. Ohio · Graham v. Connor · Bell v. Wolfish · Tennessee v. Garner · Hudson v. McMillian

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 27 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““[Courts] must avoid substituting [their] personal notions of proper police procedure for the instantaneous decision of the officer at the scene. [Courts] must never allow the theoretical, sanitized world of our imagination to replace the dangerous and complex world that policemen face every day. What constitutes ‘reasonable’ action may seem quite different to someone facing a possible assailant than to someone analyzing the question at leisure.” 22”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[w]here the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force. Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon ... deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has been given.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force—deadly or not—in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other `seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its `reasonableness' standard, rather than under a `substantive due process' approach.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.