35 Kan. App. 2d 274 - State v. Moore’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 4 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““[I]t is apparent that although K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 8-1567(f) and K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 8-1567(g) have the same severity level, a nonperson felony, the legislature intended to treat them as separate offenses because it mandated separate punishments for them. Even if K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 8-1567(f) and K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 8-1567(g) are not separate offenses, Moore’s lack of notice that he would be sentenced under the harsher penalties of subsection (g) if he was convicted as a third-time offender would be a departure from due process. In Wheeler, No. 92,428, where Wheeler pled guilty to felony DUI, the panel concluded that due process requires that a defendant charged with DUI receive notice of the crime classification with which he or she is charged and of the penalties that could result. Slip op. at 10.” 35 Kan. App. 2d at 288-89 . “In summaiy, sentencing Moore as a sixth-time offender under K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 8-1567(g) when he had received notice that he was being charged as a third-time DUI offender constitutes upping the ante’ against Moore. Fourth and subsequent DUI convictions are punished more harshly than third DUI convictions. See K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 8-1567(f) and (g). Based on the disparate penalties between third DUI convictions and fourth and subsequent DUI convictions, due process requires that the defendant receive notice of the particular subsection under which the defendant is being charged. If the defendant is never notified of the particular subsection which is being charg”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Moody

2. ““The complaint and the State’s representations at the preliminary hearing indicated that Moore was being prosecuted as a third-time DUI offender under K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 8-1567(f). “Nevertheless, the journal entry of sentencing states that Moore was sentenced as a sixth-time DUI offender. Moore was fined $2,500 and sentenced to 6 months in jail with a 12-month postrelease supervision period with die DOC. The 12-mondi postrelease supervision period is mandatory for fourth and subsequent DUI offenses, but is not a requirement for third DUI offenses. See K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 8-1567(f) and (g). Moreover, fourth and subsequent DUI offenses require a $2,500 fine whereas third DUI offenses require a fine between $1,500 and $2,500. See K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 8-1567(f) and (g). “It is apparent that Moore was sentenced under the provisions of K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 8-1567(g), which apply to fourth or subsequent DUI convictions and carry greater penalties than those for third DUI convictions under K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 8-1567(f). Nevertheless, Moore received notice before conviction indicating that he was being charged with a nonperson felony DUI as only a third-time offender. Was this notice sufficient to sentence him as a sixth-time DUI offender under the harsher penalty provisions of K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 8-1567(g)?” 35 Kan. App. 2d at 287 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Moody