35 Md. App. 111 - State v. Wilson’s Empirical Analysis
1977
Citation profile
3 federal appellate · 28 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 31 later decisions — most recently September 2003 · most notably Wilson v. State (1978), 58 Md. App. 637 - Hines v. State (1984)
3 federal appellate · 28 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Barker v. Wingo · Snyder v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts · Klopfer v. State of North Carolina · Frisbie v. Collins · Moore v. Arizona
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 31 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““We reject, therefore, the rule that a defendant who fails to demand a speedy trial forever waives his right. This does not mean, however, that the defendant has no responsibility to assert his right. We think the better rule is that the defendant’s assertion of or failure to assert his right to a speedy trial is one of the factors to be considered in an inquiry into the deprivation of the right. Such a formulation avoids the rigidities of the demand-waiver rule and the resulting possible unfairness in its application. It allows the trial court to exercise a judicial discretion based on the circumstances, including due consideration of any applicable formal procedural rule. It would permit, for example, a court to attach a different weight to a situation in which the defendant knowingly fails to object from a situation in which his attorney acquiesces in long delay without adequately informing his client, or from a situation in which no counsel is appointed. It would also allow a court to weigh the frequency and force of the objections as opposed to attaching significant weight to a purely proforma objection.” (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“What is the denial of the right to a speedy trial? ... [I]t is not one thing but many things. What represents an inordinate delay within the contemplation of the Sixth Amendment, therefore, depends upon precisely what it is that the defendant seeks when he asserts a ‘speedy trial’ claim. It is one thing when he demands, T have a right to a speedy trial; therefore, try me immediately.’ It is yet another when he demands, ‘I have a right to a speedy trial; therefore, release me upon my recognizance if you do not intend to give me an immediate trial.’ It is yet something else again when he demands, 7 had a right to a speedy trial; therefore, dismiss forever all charges against me.’ In view of what is at stake, it makes all the difference in the world to discover that end which a defendant is seeking to attain. The request, ‘Try me today!,’ is a far cry from that other request, ‘Try me never, because you did not try me yesterday!’ ... There is a gaping disparity between ordering an immediate trial, releasing upon bail or recognizance, and dismissing with ultimate prejudice society’s accusation of outlawry. The values invigorating the Sixth Amendment are vitally engaged when an accused seeks expeditious resolution of the charges against him; those values are sometimes shamelessly exploited when an accused waits to turn to the Sixth Amendment for the first time in order to avoid that resolution of the charges against him. In dealing with the dismissal of an indictment because of a d”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority““The State of Maryland waived jurisdiction and denied the defendant a speedy trial when he was before the Honorable Court on July 14, 1972. The Petitioner was removed to State of Maryland and thereafter taken before the Carroll County Circuit Court on July 14,1972, and Petitioner was ready for trial, and thereupon the Circuit Court for the State of Maryland waived all jurisdiction by releasing Petitioner out of their custody and permitting Petitioner to be moved to Massachusetts when he was prepared for trial." (Emphasis supplied) State v. Wilson, 35 Md. App. 111, 139-140, n. 16 , 371 A. 2d 140 (1977).”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Wilson v. State
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.