35 Md. App. 61 - Hoes v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 43 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 45 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The relevance of the prior conduct rests upon two things: the similarity of the method of assault and the fact that it was upon the same victim. That he had shot her before in like manner is inferentially relevant to his intent to do so this time, especially in light of his admission that he had discharged the firearm. As the state pointed out, the fact that appellant had shot [his common-law wife] a few years earlier makes it less likely that shooting her this time was an accident or mistake. Had the prior assault been directed toward another victim, it would have had little or no relevance in evaluating his intent towards [his common-law wife]. Indeed, such an inference of intent to do that which was done would be greater the more often it had occurred, in like manner and to the same person. The similarity of nature and victim creates the relevant interrelationship.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Wynn v. State · 780 So. 2d 106 - Robertson v. State

2. ““ ‘The frequently enunciated general rule in this state, followed uniformly elsewhere, is that in a prosecution for a particular crime, evidence which in any manner shows or tends to show that the accused has committed another crime wholly independent of that for which he is on trial, even though it be a crime of the same type, is irrelevant and inadmissible. Harrison v. State, 276 Md. 122 , 345 A. 2d 830 (1975), MacEwen v. State, 194 Md. 492, 500 , 71 A. 2d 464 (1950); Young v. State, 152 Md. 89, 91 , 136 A. 46 (1927); Weinstein v. State, 146 Md. 80, 88 , 125 A. 889 (1924); Wethington v. State, 3 Md. App. 237, 240 , 238 A. 2d 581 (1968); Gorski v. State, 1 Md. App. 200, 202 , 228 A. 2d 835 (1967). This principle is merely an application of the policy rule prohibiting the initial introduction by the prosecution of evidence of bad character. Thus, the state may not present evidence of other criminal acts of the accused unless the evidence is “substantially relevant for some other purpose than to show a probability that he committed the crime on trial because he is a man of criminal character.” C. McCormick, Evidence § 190 (2d ed. 1972).’ Id. at 669. and its exceptions; “ ‘There are exceptions to this general exclusionary rule which, perhaps, are equally well-recognized. Thus, evidence of other crimes may be admitted when it tends to establish (1) motive, (2) intent, (3) absence of mistake, (4) a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 37 Md. App. 222 - Waine v. State

3. ““1. Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in its determination that the ‘intent’ requirements for ‘assault with intent to murder’ and ‘assault with intent to maim, disfigure, or disable’ are mutually exclusive such that, when based on a single act, convictions on both cannot stand? “2. Assuming arguendo that the convictions cannot both stand, whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in determining that the appropriate remedy was to vacate the assault with intent to murder conviction without affording the State an opportunity for a new trial?””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Jenkins