¶1Thereafter, on January 12, 1892, the following opinion, concurred in by Justices Pope and Wallace, was filed by
¶2This is a motion to set aside the judgment heretofore rendered in this case, upon the ground that the court, as organized at the time of the hearing, as well as at the time of the rendition of said judgment, was not a constitutional tribunal invested with power to hear and determine said cause. The facts out of which this contention arises are undisputed, and are as follows: The late Chief Justice Simpson having died, on the 26th day of December, 1890, and the vacancy in that office thereby occasioned not having been filled, the Supreme Court was left with only tw'o members, the two surviving Associate Justices, and one of them being disqualified from hearing this case by relationship to one of the parties, his honor, Judge Wallace, was duly commissioned by his excellency, the governor, in place of the Associate Justice thus disqualified under the provisions of section 6 of article IY. of the Constitution ; and the court being thus constituted, heard this case in January, 1891, and rendered the judgment nowin question.
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¶5"While, therefore, the section under consideration does declare in general terms that the Supreme Court “shall consist of a Chief Justice and two Associate Justices,” this general declaration is *154qualified by the words immediately following, in the same sentence, “any two of whom shall constitute a quorum the plain meaning of which is, that while the number composing a full court is three, yet any two of the three named shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of any business committed to such tribunal. The language being '■'•any two” of the three officials just named, we are unable to conceive by what authority a court could construe such language as confining the provision to some particular two of the three; for that would entirely destroy the force of the word “any,” and render necessary the interpolation of some other words not found in the section. The fact that there is a difference in official title between the Chief and his Associates, and that the general assembly has by statute provided a different salary and a higher rank for the Chief Justice, and has invested him with certain powers not conferred upon the Associate Justices, cannot affect the question as to whether the con'stitution has made the Chief Justice one of the essential elements of the Supreme Court, for that must be determined by the provisions of the constitution itself; and, as we have seen, those provisions do not either in express terms, or by necessary implication, constitute the Chief Justice an essential element of the Supreme Court, in such a sense as without that officer there can be no such court.competent to transact the business appertaining to such a tribunal. On the contrary, as it seems to us, the terms of the constitution necessarily imply that any two of the three officers composing a full court are competent to transact such business, whether such two consist of the Chief Justice and one of the Associate Justices, or of the two Associate Justices only.
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¶7Notwithstanding the criticism which has been so freely indulged in, of the illustration used in Sullivan v. Speights (14 S. C., 358, supra), drawn from the constitutional quorum of the house of representatives, we still think the analogy is striking. The Constitution, in section 4, of art. II., declares that: “The house of representatives shall consist of one hundred and twenty-four members,” and in section 8, of the same article, that, “The senate shall be composed of one member from each county,” except Charleston, which shall be allowed two senators; and then in section 14, of the same article, it is declared that “a majority of each house shall constitute a quorum to do business.” Now, confining our attention to the house of representatives, is it not perfectly apparent that the language found in these constitutional provisions, is practically identical with a declaration that “the house of representatives shall consist of one hundred and twenty-four members, any sixty-three of whom shall constitute a quorum ;” and if such was the language, the analogy would be perfect. If the house consists of one hundred and twenty-four members, and a majority of the house is declared to be a quorum, it is practically the same thing as saying that any sixty-three members of the house shall constitute a quorum; and this is what has been said in the ease of the State v. Hayne and Mackey, 8 S. C.. 367.
¶8A similar illustration may be drawn from the undisputed practice of the highest tribunal in this country. In the act of congress (Rev. Stat. U. S., sec. 673), providing for the organiza•tion of the Supreme Court of the United States, the language *156used is practically identical with that found in our constitution, establishing the Supreme Court of this State, viz., that “the Supreme Court of the United States shall consist of a Chief Jus-' tice of the United States and eight Associate Justices, any six of whom shall constitute a quorum,” and although, upon two comparatively recent occasions, that tribunal has been deprived by death of its Chief Justice, the business of the court has been proceeded with, without question, so far as we are informed, by the surviving Associate Justices. „
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¶12*158The view contended for rests largely upon the assumption that the words, “shall continue in office until their successors shall be elected and qualified,” must be construed as imperative, and that the effect of these words is to forbid a Justice of the Supreme Court from vacating his office by resignation or otherwise, before the expiration of the term for which he has been elected. But this view ignores the well settled rule that in the construction of a statute or a constitution, the word “shall” may receive a permissive, rather than an imperative, interpretation, when necessary to carry out the true intent of the provision in which such word is found. Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes, section 316; Railroad Company v. Hecht, 95 U. S., 168. See, also, Potter’s Dwarris on Statutes, 220; Sedgwick on Statutes and Constitutional Law, 438-9. It seems to us that the manifest object of the section of the constitution in which the words reiied upon occur, was noi to require imperatively that a Justice of the Supreme Court should, under all or any circumstances, hold his office until his successor might be elected and qualified, but simply to permit him to do so. The purpose was, not to compel an officer to remain in office'until his successor should be elected, but only to permit him to do so.
¶13The framers of the constitution must be regarded as having contemplated the contingency that at some time all of the members of the Supreme Court would not be in attendance, and, therefore, to provide for such a contingency, after declaring who should constitute the Supreme Court they immediately after-wards, and in the same sentence, qualified this general declaration by providing that any two of the constituent members of the court should constitute a quorum, so that the court might proceed with its business just as if the court were full. Any other view would, it seems to us, completely nullify the provision for a quorum. There is nothing whatever in the constitution indicating an intention that the provision for a quorum should only apply in case of a temporary absence of one of the members of the court; and, on the contrary, the language used is equally applicable where the failure of such member to attend is occasioned by death, as where it results from some temporary cause. Such, as we have seen, is the accepted view in relation to the highest *159judicial tribunal in this country, where the language constituting it is practically identical with that' which we are called upon to construe, and such, so far as we are informed,'is the universally accepted view in relation to all bodies where provision is made for a quorum.
¶14We are at a loss to perceive how the provision in section 11, of article IV., for filling all vacancies in the office of a Justice of the Supreme Court can affect, or in any way qualify, the distinct declaration that any two of the Justices shall constitute a quorum. For the framers of the constitution must be regarded as knowing that some time would necessarily elapse before a vacancy could be filled, and the very purpose of the provision for a quorum was to enable the tribunal to proceed with its business during such time as might elapse before the vacancy could be filled, so as to prevent delay in the transaction of the public business.
¶15We are entirely satisfied, therefore, that, in any view of the question, where the office of Chief Justice has been vacated by death, the two surviving Associate Justices, constituting a quorum of the court, are fully competent to exercise all the powers conferred upon the Supreme Court.
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¶17In accordance with these views, the order refusing the motion to set aside the judgment in this case, because rendered by an illegal and incompetent tribunal, has heretofore been entered.
¶18See 34 S. C., 112.