Porea v. Moses’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 4 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““ ... If it was the lawmakers’ intention to require that a sixty-day notice must be served upon the tenant, and that an ejectment suit cannot be brought until the sixty-day period had expired, unequivocal language to that effect would undoubtedly have been employed. The section in question states that ‘no tenant shall be obliged to surrender possession . . . until the ex piration of at least sixty days after written notice . . . (Italics ours). It seems clear to us that the word ‘obliged’ as used is a synonym of the words ‘compelled’ ‘forced’ and ‘required.’ The plain and reasonable meaning is that no tenant can be evicted until sixty days have expired counting from the date of the written notice, and that in any suit the judgment of eviction will not and cannot become operative or executory until sixty days after the notice to vacate had been served. There is nothing in the section which prohibits a landlord from bringing his proceeding against a tenant, after the notice required by local law, and all that the section intends is that under no circumstances can the tenant be ejected until sixty days after the vacate notice was served.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Sellers v. Switzer

2. ““(o) No tenant shall be obliged to surrender possession of any housing accomodations pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (2), (3), (4), (5), or (6) of subsection (a) until the expiration of at least sixty days after written notice from the landlord that he desires to recover possession of such housing accommodations for one of the purposes specified in such paragraphs.” Sección 209(c) Sousing and Bent Control Act of 1948, 50 V.S.C.A., Appendix, sección 1899.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Alméstica v. Lafitte

3. ““It is to be noted that under the above set out interpretation a judgment in a state court could not under the Federal Law force a tenant to deliver possession of a housing accommodation until after the expiration of the sixty-day notice provided in the Act. Therefore, a state judgment evicting a tenant could not be enforced on or after April 1, 1948, unless sixty days had passed since written notice was given to the tenant. ...””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Sellers v. Switzer