State v. Brown’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

5 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 5 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Longstanding Fourth Amendment jurisprudence precludes a landlord from consenting to the search of his tenant’s residence unless he also lives in the premises or the tenant has vacated the residence. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 , 81 S.Ct. 776 , 5 L.Ed.2d 828 (1961). When a defendant challenges a warrantless search conducted l^on the basis of third-party consent, the validity of the consent is tested against the rule of United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 , 94 S.Ct. 988 , 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974), in which the Court explained that “the consent of one who possesses common authority over the premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsent-ing person with whom that authority is shared.” Commenting on Matlock , the Supreme Court stated in Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 , 126 S.Ct. 1515 , 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006): It is ... easy to imagine different facts on which, if known, no common authority could sensibly be suspected. A person on the scene who identifies himself, say, as a landlord or a hotel manager calls up no customary understanding of authority to admit guests without the consent of the current occupant.... A tenant in the ordinary course does not take rented premises subject to any formal or informal agreement that the landlord may let visitors into the dwelling, and a hotel guest customarily has no reason to expect the manager to allow anyone but his own employees into his room. In these circumstances, neither state-law property rights, nor comm”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 51 So. 3d 98 - State v. Nicholas

2. “While anyone who gives information to the police may be called an “informant,” a distinction may be drawn between an anonymous tipster and a citizen who witnesses or is the victim of criminal conduct and reports to police as a matter of civic duty. When the informant is an anonymous person, it is critical that there be some specific showing that he is a credible person and that his information is reliable. In contrast, citizen informant reports based on firsthand knowledge carry a high indicia of credibility. The citizen informer is a presumptively inherently credible source.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 89 So. 3d 463 - State v. Everett

3. “For purposes of applying the Rodriguez test for apparent third-party authority to consent, we need not dwell on whether a reasonable police officer in Barrere’s position could have believed that Patrina Brown, who stated she lived in 721 Philip Street, had common authority over 719 Philip Street sufficient to consent to his entry even if he believed that her grandmother had ostensibly given her that authority. Chapman instructs that Ms. Brown’s grandmother herself could not have given consent to enter the premises without the tenant’s permission.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 51 So. 3d 98 - State v. Nicholas