State v. Jones’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 4 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The State has the burden of justifying the delay. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 ; Steeley v. City of Gadsden, 533 So.2d 671, 680 (Ala.Crim.App.1988). Barker recognizes three categories of reasons for delay: (1) deliberate delay, (2) negligent delay, and (3) justified delay. 407 U.S. at 531 . Courts assign different weight to different reasons for delay. Deliberate delay is ‘weighted heavily’ against the State. 407 U.S. at 531 . Deliberate delay includes an ‘attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense’ or ‘ “to gain some tactical advantage over (defendants) or to harass them.” ’ 407 U.S. at 531 & n. 32 (quoting United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325 , 92 S.Ct. 455 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971)). Negligent delay is weighted less heavily against the State than is deliberate delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 ; Ex parte Carrell, 565 So.2d [104,] 108 [ (Ala.1990) ]. Justified delay — which includes such occurrences as missing witnesses or delay for which the defendant is primarily responsible — is not weighted against the State. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 ; Zumbado v. State, 615 So.2d 1223, 1234 (Ala.Crim.App.1993) (‘ “Delays occasioned by the defendant or on his behalf are excluded from the length of delay and are heavily counted against the defendant in applying the balancing test of Barker.” ’) (quoting McCallum v. State, 407 So.2d 865, 868 (Ala.Crim.App.1981)).””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. John Charles Yocum v. State of Alabama.

2. “"Jones did not explain or allege how the delay frustrated or impeded her ability to obtain Milton’s presence for trial. Instead, Jones complained merely that it would be difficult to subpoena Milton in Texas because Jones '[would] have to go through that Uniform Compact Act to get him subpoenaed, which may or may not be a problem.’ (R. 98.) Thus, the alleged prejudice appears in no way to be related to the delay attributable to the State’s actions, but rather is solely related to the statutory constraints Jones faced in formulating her defense strategy. Accordingly, the prejudice Jones faced is not attributable to the State's actions and the trial court erred in finding any actual prejudice on this ground.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Robinson

3. ““ ‘Some of the delay in this case was caused by neutral reasons that are not attributable to either the State or the appellant. The investigation was completed, forensic analysis was performed, psychological testing was done, discovery was conducted, and numerous evi-dentiary matters were resolved. Neutral reasons for delay do not ordinarily require a dismissal of the case based on a violation of the right to a speedy trial. See, Pierson v. State, 677 So.2d 830, 831 (Ala.Crim.App.1996).’ ””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. John Charles Yocum v. State of Alabama.