Zepczyk v. Nelson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 7 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““In denying the motion for summary judgment, the trial court also correctly considered the provisions of sec. 204.34, Stats. . . . “Even if the insured had knowledge of the 100 percent clause in the application when he sig:ned it, and that the statement was false and made with the intent to deceive or increased the risk or contributed to the loss, the insurance company could not avoid liability to an innocent third person on the grounds that the car was driven by a person other than the named insured and who could not be excluded under the provisions of sec. 204.34(1). Such a situation would permit an insurance company to avoid liability by inserting provisions in an application which they could not avoid under circumstances described in sec. 204.34(1). The result would be entirely inconsistent with the statutory purposes of sec. 204.34(1), which were well set forth in Pavelski v. Roginski, 1 Wis. 2d 345 , 84 N.W.2d 84 (1957), wherein it was stated: “ ‘It is clear that the legislature was more concerned with the interest of members of the public who might be injured under such circumstances than it was in protecting persons driving under the influence of liquor or narcotics or using automobiles in unlawful pursuits, from having to pay damages.’ ” Zepczyk, 35 Wis. 2d at 145-146 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 115 Wis. 2d 257 - Rauch v. American Family Insurance · Leo Bernstein v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Roy Austin Stephens v. Roy Austin Stephens, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company