Townsend v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

27 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 27 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[W]e additionally note that this Strickland- type determination of the existence of prejudice, required by Mickens, is in keeping with our own holdings. In Wilburn v. State, 346 Ark. 137 , 56 S.W.3d 365 (2001), an attorney-disqualification case, we held that this court reviews a trial court’s decision to disqualify an attorney under an abuse-of-discretion standard. There, this court first noted Supreme Court cases holding that where a constitutional right to counsel exists, there is a correlative right to representation that is free from conflicts of interest. In addition, the Wilburn court stated the following: The cornerstone principle in all conflict cases is whether prejudice will result to the client as a result of the conflict of interest. See Sheridan v. State, 331 Ark. 1 , 959 S.W.2d 29 (1998). That prejudice must be real and have some demonstrable detrimental effect on the client and not merely be abstract or theoretical. See Simmons v. Lockhart, 915 F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1990); Sheridan v. State, supra. Wilburn, 346 Ark. at 143 . Prejudice will be presumed from a counsel’s conflict of interest only when the defendant demonstrates that counsel actively represented conflicting interests. Price v. State, 347 Ark. 708 , 66 S.W.3d 653 (2002) (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra; Johnson v. State, 321 Ark. 117 , 900 S.W.2d 940 (1995)). See also Davis v. State, 345 Ark. 161 , 44 S.W.3d 726 (2001) (holding that prejudice is presumed from a conflict of interest only when the defen”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Echols v. State

2. “In Mickens, the Court rejected the argument that automatic reversal is required whenever a trial court neglects a duty to inquire into a potential conflict. Instead, the Court held that an “actual conflict of interest” means “a conflict that affected counsel’s performance, as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties.” ... Until a defendant shows that his counsel actively represented conflicting interests, he has not established the constitutional predicate for his claim of ineffective assistance. Thus, in the absence of an “actual conflict,” a defendant alleging counsel’s performance was deficient due to a conflict must demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” In other words, an analysis of a conflict of interest under Mickens requires the same kind of analysis — and the same kind of demonstration of | lftprejudice— that is required under Strickland v. Washington, as opposed to the presumption of prejudice (and the consequent automatic reversal) that was explained in Holloway.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Lee v. State

3. “Thus, in the absence of an “actual conflict,” a defendant alleging counsel’s performance was deficient due to a conflict must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” [Mickens, 535 U.S. 162, 166 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 694 )]. In other words, an analysis of a conflict of interest under Mickens requires the same kind of analysis — and the same kind of demonstration of prejudice •— that is required under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), as opposed to the presumption of prejudice (and the consequent automatic reversal) that was explained in Holloway.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Echols v. State