¶1concurring. I agree ustice, affirmed in all respects. However, I write in order to address the majority opinion’s analysis of the admissibility of Tim Dillard’s testimony about a co-conspirator’s (Buck) statement to him in which the co-conspirator related what he had been told by another co-conspirator (Denaro). The testimony at issue includes two out-of-court statements. Thus, each statement must be analyzed under Rule 801 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence that sets forth the applicable definitions for hearsay. While it is true that the statements at issue are out-of-court-statements under Ark. R. Evid. 801(c), those statements are specifically excluded from the definition of hearsay under Ark. R. Evid. 801(d). As such, they are not hearsay and, thus, are admissible under the Arkansas Rules of Evidence.
¶2Specifically, an analysis of each statement reveals that neither statement was hearsay. At trial Dillard was allowed to testify to Buck telling him “Denaro said it’s clear to come in through the back.” The court initially overruled defense counsel’s objection under Ark. R. Evid. 801 (d) (2) (v) (not hearsay) and Ark. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) (hearsay exceptions). Subsequently, following a hearing outside the jury’s presence, the trial court granted the State’s motion to allow Dillard to testify about the conversation he had with Denaro’s co-conspirator under Rule 801(d)(2)(v).
¶3Statements offered against a party and made by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of a conspiracy are not hearsay. Ark. R. Evid. 801(d) (2) (v) (2002); Henderson v. State, 329 Ark. 526, 953 S.W.2d 26 (1997); Spears v. State, 321 Ark. 504, 905 S.W.2d 828 (1995). Furthermore, this court has held that where an actual criminal act is performed by an alleged accomplice, the accomplice’s statements made during the transaction are admissible as statements of a co-conspirator. Pyle v. State, 314 Ark. 165, 862 S.W.2d 823 (1993).
¶4As previously indicated, there are two out-of-court-statements at issue. First, we look to the out-of-court statement made by Denaro to Buck. The majority correctly holds that this statement is not hearsay under Ark. Rule Evid. 801 (d) (2) (i). It was offered against Denaro and was his own statement.
¶5Having concluded that Denaro’s out-of-court-statement is not hearsay, we must determine whether Buck’s statement to Dillard is admissible under Ark. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) (v). First, Buck’s statement was being offered against a party, Denaro, thereby satisfying the first prong of Rule 801(d)(2). The second prong requires that the statement be made by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Buck and Denaro were co-conspirators, thereby qualifying Buck’s statement under the first part of the Rule’s second prong. The remaining issue then becomes whether Buck’s statement was made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
¶6This court has held that statements by an alleged co-conspirator during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy are admissible if the State makes a prima facie showing that a conspiracy existed between the declarant, in this case Buck, and the defendant, in this case Denaro. Dyer v. State, 343 Ark. 422, 36 S.W.3d 724 (2001). In Dyer, we stated:
Although this court has had few opportunities to discuss the ‘in furtherance of element of Rule 801 (d) (2) (v), it has held that statements designed to further the specific objective of the conspiracy are made in furtherance of the conspiracy. Dixon, 310 Ark. 460, 839 S.W.2d 173. Federal cases interpreting the corresponding federal rule of evidence hold that this requirement should be interpreted broadly. See Cordova, 157 F.3d 587; United States v. Edwards, 994 F.2d 417 (8th Cir.1993). Thus, statements that have an overall effect of facilitating the conspiracy or that somehow advance the objectives of the conspiracy are said to be in furtherance of the conspiracy. Id.; United States v. Garcia, 893 F.2d 188 (8th Cir.1990). Statements that identify a fellow conspirator are also considered to be in furtherance of the conspiracy. Id. (citing United States v. Handy, 668 F.2d 407 (8th Cir.1982)).
¶7Id. at 429, 33 S.W.3d at 728. We further concluded that statements that may be viewed as being designed to enlist one’s assistance or to induce one’s aid in achieving one of the objectives of the conspiracy are admissible under Rule 801(d) (2) (v). Dyer v. State, supra. Like the statements in Dyer, Buck’s statement to Dillard as to what Denaro said may be viewed as an attempt to enlist the assistance of Dillard and, thus, is not hearsay under Rule 801 (d) (2) (v).
¶8The majority overlooks the “during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy” language in essentially holding that Rule 801(d) (2) (v) is never applicable when a co-conspirator’s statement contains an out-of-court statement made by a party. I disagree. The majority appropriately holds that each out-of-court statement must be independently analyzed. Moreover, it is undisputed that a statement made by a defendant co-conspirator (Buck) is admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(i). Yet, the majority goes on to conclude that Rule 801(d) (2) (v) does not apply when the co-conspirator’s statement contains an admission by the defendant. The plain language of the rule makes no such exception.
¶9The majority’s reliance on Dean v. State, 293 Ark. 75, 732 S.W.2d 855 (1987), is misplaced. In that case, the statement at issue was not the declarant’s own admission of involvement, but rather a statement implicating only the defendant. Here, the statement is an admission that Buck had received the information necessary to commit the aggravated robbery. By telling Dillard the information he was told by Denaro, that is, that it was clear to go in the back door, Buck implicated both himself and Denaro in the commission of the aggravated robbery.
¶10Rule 801(d) (2) (v) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence declares that any statement made by a co-conspirator during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy is simply not hearsay. While the majority opinion expresses concern about a co-conspirator’s statement being admissible “regardless of the number of persons it may have passed through before it reaches testimony at trial,” such a conclusion ignores the “during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy” language in the Rule. Rule 801(d)(2)(v) does not apply to: (a) statements made by someone other than a co-conspirator; or (b) statements not made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
¶11For the above mentioned reasons, I conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged testimony. Accordingly, I concur with result reached by the majority.