350 Pa. Super. 341 - Commonwealth v. Bond’s Empirical Analysis
1986
Citation profile
24 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 25 later decisions — most recently September 2008 · most notably 374 Pa. Super. 549 - Commonwealth v. Trill (1988), 396 Pa. Super. 106 - Commonwealth v. Chilcote (1990)
24 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on United States v. Ewell · Griffin v. United States · Commonwealth v. Cohen · Commonwealth v. Wade · Jones v. Commonwealth
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 25 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[t]he critical point, as I see it, is that in instituting her constitutional challenge, appellant initiated foreseeable delay for which the Commonwealth was not responsible. The period extending from the date of appellant’s motion to the date of the trial court’s order denying the motion should be excluded from the 180-day period. To permit the period to run while the court deliberated on the motion would be to permit appellant to wield her right to a speedy trial in an unjust and uncontemplated manner.”
5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence“After an appeal is taken or review of a quasijudicial order is sought, the trial court or other government unit may: (6) Proceed further in any matter in which a nonappealable interlocutory order has been entered, notwithstanding the filing of a notice of appeal or a petition for review of the order.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence“Here, appellant’s petition for leave to file an interlocutory appeal rendered her unavailable for trial. Given that, we must look to see whether appellant’s unavailability resulted in any delay beyond the date on which this court remanded the record to the trial court. Plainly, it did; some delay in scheduling a case for trial is inevitable whenever we remand, for the trial court cannot be expect ed to drop everything else and proceed at once with the case remanded. Here we do not know from the record exactly how much delay occurred, for as mentioned, the record does not disclose exactly when we remanded the record; but we do know that the delay was slight, for on March 8, 1982, less than thirty days after our decision denying appellant’s petition for leave to file an interlocutory appeal, the trial court scheduled trial for April 19, 1982, and but for appellant’s further request for continuance, trial would have commenced then. Our cases establish that unavailability cannot be defined precisely but must be determined according to the facts of each case____ I therefore have no difficulty in finding that the delay from the date of our remand to the trial court to the date set for trial, April 19, 1982, was fairly attributable to appellant’s unavailability. The delay is therefore “automatically excluded,” ... from which it follows that appellant was timely tried. (Citations omitted)”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.