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← 351 F.3d 1001 - Maestas v. Lujan

Maestas v. Lujan’s Empirical Analysis

351 F.3d 1001 · 2003

Citation profile

71
cited by 71 later decisions
3
states following
November 2024
most recently cited

24 federal appellate · 24 district · 3 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 71 later decisions — most recently November 2024 · most notably Curley v. Klem (2007), Carswell v. Borough of Homestead (2004)

24 federal appellate · 24 district · 3 state decisions

480200320102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1291 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act)) · 42 U.S.C. § 2000E (§ 701 of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964)

Relies on Harlow v. Fitzgerald · Graham v. Connor · Mitchell v. Forsyth · Duncan v. Walker · SAUCIER v. KATZ Et Al.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 71 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[t]he moving party may (1) facially attack the complaint's allegations as to the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, or (2) go beyond allegations contained in the complaint by presenting evidence to challenge the factual basis upon which subject matter jurisdiction rests.”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “In short, the disputed issues of material fact concerning the objective reasonableness of Mr. Lujan’s actions are dispositive of the qualified immunity issue. Further, as stated above, Mr. Lujan retained the defense of immunity from liability even though the jury was needed to resolve issues of objective legal reasonableness. Therefore, the district court properly presented the reasonableness element of the qualified immunity analysis to the jury.”). 10 . Compare Stephenson v. Doe, 332 F.3d 68 , 81 (2d Cir.2003) (”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “1. Defendants’ motions for summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity (Docs. 8k, 89, 91) are GRANTED; 2. Plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment (Doc. 87) is DENIED AS MOOT; Defendants’ requests for oral argument (Docs. 101, 107) are DENIED AS MOOT; 3. 4. The pretrial conference and trial set for May 9, 2005 and June 27, 2005, respectively, are VACATED; and 5. A final order enter concurrently herewith.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.