¶1specially concurring:
¶2I concur in the decision to reverse and remand. Even assuming that section 115 — 10 has some continuing validity, the statements to Boston and Shalores lack “sufficient safeguards of reliability.” 725 ILCS 5/115 — 10(b)(1) (West 1998); see People v. Cookson, 335 Ill. App. 3d 786, 794-98, 780 N.E.2d 807, 813-16 (2002) (Cook, J., dissenting); People v. Barger, 251 Ill. App. 3d 448, 469-73, 624 N.E.2d 405, 418-20 (1993) (Cook, J., specially concurring).
¶3I disagree, however, that section 115 — 10 has any continuing validity. Crawford was certainly critical of “sufficient safeguards of reliability” hearings. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 200, 124 S. Ct. at 1371 (“amorphous,” “unpredictable,” “demonstrated capacity to admit” statements that should be excluded). We should not try to pick out pieces of section 115 — 10 that might survive Crawford. The legislature should decide whether it wants a new section 115 — 10, one which will be very different from the one it enacted.
¶4Section 115 — 10 may be summarized as follows. The hearsay statement is substantively admissible whether or not the child testifies. The only restriction is that the State must call the child as a witness, unless the child is “unavailable.” If the child is unavailable, there must be “corroborative evidence of the act.” In any case, there must be a section 115 — 10 hearing to establish “sufficient safeguards of reliability.” 725 ILCS 5/115 — 10(b)(1) (West 1998). Crawford substantially undercuts section 115 — 10. The admission of testimonial hearsay violates the confrontation clause even if the witness is legitimately unavailable, unless there was a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 203, 124 S. Ct. at 1374. The idea that “sufficient safeguards of reliability” are of some help is rejected. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 199, 124 S. Ct. at 1371. Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the constitution actually prescribes: confrontation. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 203, 124 S. Ct. at 1374. Certainly the statements to the sheriffs detective and to Dr. Nichols-Johnson were testimonial hearsay, and their admission was prejudicial to defendant.
¶5Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 197 n.9, 124 S. Ct. at 1369 n.9, went on to hold that when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the confrontation clause places “no constraints at all” on the use of his prior testimonial statements. “The [c]lause does not bar admission of a statement so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 n.9, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 198 n.9, 124 S. Ct. at 1369 n.9. C.M., who basically answered “I don’t know” to every question asked her, did not appear for cross-examination in this case. Placing a witness on the stand who is unable to understand what happened, cannot remember what happened, cannot understand the questions asked, or is unable to answer them does not afford an opportunity for cross-examination.
¶6Children’s hearsay cases are unique. In many such cases the effect of section 115 — 10 was to get the supposed testimony of an incompetent child before the trial court, often through the testimony of an interested witness who was given free rein to interpret what the child had said or done. Under section 115 — 10, the child usually could not be cross-examined. In Crawford, in contrast, there were no concerns whether the statement had actually been made and there would have been no problem cross-examining the wife at trial and allowing her to defend or explain the statement.
¶7Did Crawford mean what it said, that the declarant must appear for cross-examination to defend or explain the hearsay statement? Is it sufficient that a declarant who is unable to understand or answer questions is simply placed in the witness chair? The issue was touched on in Green, where a co-accused’s testimony at preliminary hearing was admitted substantively, despite the fact that when called at trial he was evasive and uncooperative, claiming a lapse of memory. The testimony was admitted, however, because defense counsel had been afforded (and exercised) a full opportunity to cross-examine at the preliminary hearing. Green, 399 U.S. at 162, 26 L. Ed. 2d at 499, 90 S. Ct. at 1937. Green is no support for dispensing with cross-examination here.
¶8The majority justifies its decision to admit C.M.’s statements, despite her inability to testify, by citing some unusual cases, Owens (where the victim at trial could not remember the attack but could remember identifying the defendant to the police) and Fensterer (where an expert witness at trial could not remember some of the details of his expert opinion). Crawford, of course, did not cite either one of these cases. I disagree that the Crawford requirement is only illusory. There is a difference between a lack of memory and an inability to testify. A witness’s concession that he has no memory of an event is often the very result of effective cross-examination. Flores, 128 Ill. 2d at 90, 538 N.E.2d at 490, quoting Owens, 484 U.S. at 561-62, 98 L. Ed. 2d at 959, 108 S. Ct. at 844. The same cannot be said of an inability to testify.
¶9I have no quarrel with the proposition that the hearsay statement can be admitted so long as the declarant testifies, even though the declarant denies making the statement. It is true that sometimes the probative value of the hearsay statement will greatly outweigh any statement made on cross-examination. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 n.9, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 198 n.9, 124 S. Ct. at 1369 n.9 (discussing statements made by a coconspirator during the course of the conspiracy). Nevertheless, when the declarant is subjected to cross-examination and is present to defend or explain the statement, the constitutional requirement is satisfied. That did not happen here.
¶10dissenting:
¶11I respectfully dissent. The trial court’s finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and the six-year sentence of imprisonment should be affirmed.
¶12As stated by the majority, when a declarant is subject to cross-examination at trial, the confrontation clause places no restraints on the use of prior testimonial statements. Defendant’s objection that C.M.’s statement to Boston and Shalores lacks safeguards of reliability should not be the basis for reversing the trial court’s judgment.
¶13This was a bench trial. The trial court made it clear that defendant would have the opportunity at trial to argue “the reliability of the statements [and] the weight to be given to those statements at the time of hearing” at trial.
¶14The trial court made detailed findings concerning the testimony and arguments of counsel. The findings do not refer to Shalores’s testimony, and in reference to the statements of Boston, the court indicated that testimony was of little help.
¶15The trial court found the testimony of Nurse Liss to be persuasive. The court stated:
“The testimony in this case necessarily starts with the testimony of [C.M.]. It is the opinion of the [c]ourt that in the context of her age and the amount of time that has passed since the offense occurred, the manner in which she testified and identified Mr. Miles was credible. If that was the only testimony that I had heard, that would not have been sufficient to convict Mr. Miles beyond a reasonable doubt. However, I am persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Miles did commit the offense charged in [c]ount II and the offense charged in [c]ount III. And I am persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt.
There is credible testimony that Mr. Miles had the opportunity to be with this child on November 12th, 1999. There is credible testimony that when she — when the child was returned to her home, her demeanor was different; that that evening she began to complain of an injury to what she characterized as her [‘]bottom[’]; that she was, in fact, in a [sic] pain. That pain was exacerbated by a bath that was given to her that night.
I did not find Dr. Tarr’s testimony particularly persuasive. I don’t, quite frankly, think that he recalls what happened that night.
I was, however, very persuaded by Nurse Liss’s testimony in several regards. First, she clearly did remember that incident that night. As an experienced emergency room nurse, she is sensitive to the problems that are created by coaching of children. Her observation was that [C.M.] was not coached. She heard [C.M.] identify the person known to her as a Mr. Mickey as the person who hurt her bottom. At that time, the [c]ourt finds that there was no motive to warrant the conclusion that the child was coached into making that — those statements to Nurse Liss.
Parenthetically, I understand that those statements were repeated later to Leah Boston. Again, if it was only the statements to Leah Boston, I would not be persuaded because of the method of examination that was conducted by Ms. Boston. However, the method — it was not Ms. Boston who elicited the comments that I find to be most persuasive. It was Nurse Liss who did that.
Those conclusions are further corroborated by Dr. Victoria Nichols-Johnson’s testimony. Based upon her examination on November 18th of 1999 which at that period of time found excoriation within the hymenal ring, and she, to any satisfaction, discounted other causes for that excoriation, her observation of excoriation is consistent with Nurse Liss’s observation that she, in fact, on November, late hours of November 12th, early hours of November 13th, in the course of the second examination of [C.M.], observed a redness to the vaginal area where she saw a small open site, either a laceration or a tear.
The [c]ourt is further persuaded by Mr. Miles’ statements to Trudy Hopkins, which the court concludes were statements of a recognition of a guilty conscious [sic]. The [c]ourt believes those statements were made. The [c]ourt disbelieves Mr. Miles’ statement that he — actually, all he said was that he doesn’t remember having made those statements. The [c]ourt does believe that those statements were made, and the [c]ourt does believe that those were evidence of a guilty conscious [sic].”
¶16The testimony of Boston and Shalores did little to help the trial court in its job as fact finder. At the most, any asserted error as set forth by the majority was harmless. This is especially true when put in context with the court’s findings.
¶17The trial court’s judgment should be affirmed.