State v. Bell’s Empirical Analysis
1998
Citation profile
2 district · 117 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 122 later decisions — most recently August 2024 · most notably Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore (2000), Mayor and Council of Rockville v. Rylyns Enterprises, Inc. (2002)
2 district · 117 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on B.D. International Discount Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. · Porter v. States · Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore · Humble Pipe Line Co. v. Waggonner · Oaks v. Connors
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 122 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“We have said that “[t]he cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35 , 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995). Legislative intent must be sought first in the actual language of the statute. Marriott Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 346 Md. 437, 444-45 , 697 A.2d 455, 458 (1997); Stanford v. Maryland Police Training & Correctional Comm’n, 346 Md. 374, 380 , 697 A.2d 424, 427 (1997) (quoting Tidewater v. Mayor of Havre de Grace, 337 Md. 338, 344 , 653 A.2d 468, 472 (1995)); Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 256 , 674 A.2d 951, 957 (1996); Romm v. Flax, 340 Md. 690, 693 , 668 A.2d 1, 2 (1995); Oaks, 339 Md. at 35 , 660 A.2d at 429 ; Mauzy v. Hornbeck, 285 Md. 84, 92 , 400 A.2d 1091, 1096 (1979); Board of Supervisors v. Weiss, 217 Md. 133, 136 , 141 A.2d 734, 736 (1958). Where the statutory language is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a definite and simple meaning, courts normally do not look beyond the words of the statute to determine legislative intent. Marriott Employees, 346 Md. at 445 , 697 A.2d at 458 ; Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515 , 525 A.2d 628, 633 (1987); Hunt v. Montgomery County, 248 Md. 403, 414 , 237 A.2d 35, 41 (1968). This Court recently stated that “statutory language is not read in isolation, but ‘in light of the full context in which [it] appear[s], and in light of external manifestations of intent or general purpose available t”
11 later decisions quote this exact passage“`[t]he cardinal rule [of statutory interpretation] is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent.'”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage““[T]he trial court must satisfy itself that the waiver is not a product of duress or coercion, and further that the defendant has some knowledge of the jury trial right before being allowed to waive it.””
2 later decisions quote this exact passagee.g. Kang v. State · Walker v. State
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.