Cooper v. Moore

¶1I concur. In my dissent in Franklin v. Catoe, 346 S.C. 563, 552 S.E.2d 718 (2001), I concluded that a capital defendant, denied his statutory right to address the jury at the close of the guilt phase of his trial, was not entitled to be retried on his non-capital charges. Id. at 579-580, 552 S.E.2d at 727. As the majority opinion persuasively demonstrates, I was wrong. I continue to believe, however, that a capital defendant “denied the opportunity to exercise a statutory right afforded him by our death penalty statutes12” is ipso facto entitled to a new *219proceeding, and therefore would not engage in a Strickland,13prejudice analysis here.

¶2I concur in the majority’s decision to affirm the post-conviction relief judge’s order granting respondent a new trial on the charges of kidnapping, armed robbery, and conspiracy to commit armed robbery.