¶1dissenting. I disagree with the majority’s analysis in this case. Appellant Lonnie Beulah did indeed plead guilty but apparently this was done with the understanding that he would be allowed to pursue his constitutional challenge by way of a Rule 37 petition. As the circuit court said in its order denying Rule 37 relief on the merits:
The Court acknowledges that it was agreed when Beulah entered a plea of guilty that his [Rule 37] petition was contemplated, and that it was agreed that the filing of the petition herein would not abrogate the plea agreement.
¶2The circuit court then considered the petition on the merits and denied it. Now this court refuses to entertain an appeal from that denial for the reason that Rule 37 does not provide an avenue to raise matters that could have been raised on direct appeal.
¶3Of course, ordinarily, there is no direct appeal from a guilty plea except for certain limited exceptions. See Ark. R. App. P.— Crim. 1; Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.3(b). And it is blackletter law, as the majority points out, that Rule 37 petitions cannot serve as a substitute for direct appeals. Here, however, it appears that Beulah’s plea was induced by an understanding that he could avail himself of a constitutional challenge by means of a Rule 37 petition. It seems the judge and prosecutor were both aware that this was a condition of his plea.
¶4Under the circumstances, I question whether we should cast a blind eye on what actually transpired in this case. It appears that Beulah was misled by the State in entering his plea and therefore, it was not freely and voluntarily made. Under these circumstances, I would consider the appeal on the merits.
¶5For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.