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← 352 F.3d 1101 - Steinman v. Hicks

Steinman v. Hicks’s Empirical Analysis

352 F.3d 1101 · 2003

Citation profile

39
cited by 39 later decisions
August 2020
most recently cited

18 federal appellate · 1 district ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 39 later decisions — most recently August 2020 · most notably Edgar v. Avaya, Inc. (2007), Hess v. Reg-Ellen Machine Tool Corp. (2005)

18 federal appellate · 1 district ·

260200320102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (§ 404 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974) · 29 U.S.C. § 1107 (§ 407 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974) · 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (§ 409 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974) · 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (§ 502 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974)

Relies on Donovan v. Cunningham · Eaves v. Penn · Moench v. Robertson · Kuper v. Iovenko · Fink v. National Savings & Trust Co.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 39 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “One can imagine a situation in which a trust-to-trust transfer, or the similar-seeming substitute at issue in this case, would trigger a duty of sale on the part of the trustees, even in the ESOP context where there is no duty to diversify as such. There is still a duty of prudence. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a)(1)(B) [remaining citations omitted]. And in particular cases it might, as pointed out in In re: Hemmeter, 242 F.3d 1186 ,1191 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001); Kuper v. Iovenko, supra, 66 F.3d at 1458 , and Moench v. Robertson, supra, 62 F.3d at 568 , become a duty to diversify, even though failure to diversify an ESOP’s assets is not imprudence per se, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a)(2), as that would bring in the duty to diversify by the back door.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “ESOP was [the employees'] principal retirement asset . . . and was entirely invested in the stock of their employer..., and their employer was bought in a stock-for-stock deal—so that all the assets of the ESOP became stock in the acquirer by a company that had a much higher debt-equity ratio than their (former) employer and as a result its stock price was much more volatile and its bankruptcy risk greater. Then, even if the trustees did not predict the company's `impending collapse,' they might be required in the interest of the participants either to diversify the plan's stockholdings or to exchange the...stock for Treasury bills.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “Because the value of any single stock or bond is tied to the fortunes of one company, holding a single kind of stock or bond is very risky. By contrast, people who hold a diverse portfolio of stocks and bonds face less risk because they have only a small stake in each company.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.