John Carter v. James Galloway’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

11 federal appellate · 3 district · 2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 59 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““ ‘A prison official’s “deliberate indifference” to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.’ Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 , 114 S.Ct. 1970 , 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994); see Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 , 113 S.Ct. 2475 , 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993). ‘ “[P]rison officials have a duty ... to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.”’ Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833 , 114 S.Ct at 1976 (quotations and citations omitted). ‘It is not, however, every injury suffered by one inmate at the hands of another that translates into a constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim’s safety.’ Id. at 834 , 114 S.Ct. at 1977 .””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Ex parte Harvey Ruffin, Shelton Patterson, Sandra Giles and Kenneth Jones. · Hewes v. Magnusson

2. “To assume that Defendants actually made the inference that [the cellmate’s] statement constituted a serious threat would assume too much. Defendants would have had to read imaginatively all derogatory and argumentative statements made between prisoners to determine whether substantial risks of serious harm exist. We do not view the summary judgment record as supporting a contention that Defendants drew the inference or should have drawn the inference from [the cellmate’s] “one way or another” comment as a serious threat, leaving Plaintiff exposed to any substantial risk of serious harm. Defendants arguably should have placed Plaintiff elsewhere but merely negligent failure to protect an inmate from attack does not justify liability under section 1983. Defendants only possessed an awareness of [the cellmate’s] propensity for being a problematic inmate; to find Defendants sufficiently culpable would unduly reduce awareness to a more objective standard, rather than the required subjective standard set by the Supreme Court. Such a generalized awareness of risk in these circumstances does not satisfy the subjective awareness requirement.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Randal J. Chatham v. Colonel Blake Adcock

3. “Even assuming the existence of a serious risk of harm and legal causation, the prison official must' be aware of specific facts from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists — and the prison official must also “draw that inference.” ... Defendants arguably should have placed Plaintiff elsewhere but “merely negligent failure to protect an inmate from attack does not justify liability under section 1983.... ” Defendants only possessed an awareness of Inmate Barnes’s propensity for being a problematic inmate; to find Defendants sufficiently culpable would unduly reduce awareness to a more objective standard, rather than the required subjective standard set by the Supreme Court. Such a generalized awareness of risk in these circumstances does not satisfy the subjective awareness requirement.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 108 F. Supp. 3d 1167 - Hughes v. Judd