352 F. Supp. 806 - Carpenter v. Hall’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 1 district · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““[1] In order to implement and enforce the policies of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, Congress has also seen fit to provide, in Section 22(a) and Section 27, respectively, for nationwide service of process and for venue ‘in the district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business, or in the district where the offer or sale took place, if the defendant participated’ [Section 22(a)] and ‘in any such district [“in the district wherein any act or transaction constituting the violation occurred”] or in the district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business’ (Section 27). The announced policy of Congress in the 1933 and 1934 Acts is, therefore, to provide a coi- renient forum for suits involving multi-state frauds, no matter how many states the defendants are citizens of or conduct business in. Clapp v. Stearns & Co., 229 F.Supp. 305, 307 (S.D.N.Y.1964). See Hooper, supra, 282 F.2d [195] at 201. The jurisdictional and venue provisions of the federal securities laws are the teeth for the enforcement of this important legislation.” (emphasis supplied.) “That 12 U.S.C. § 94 does not prevail over the venue provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts is also supported by an analysis of the intent of Congress in enacting the former. In First National Bank of Charlotte, North Carolina v. Morgan, 132 U.S. 141 , 10 S.Ct. 37 , 33 E.Ed. 282 (1889), Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court, commented on the Congressional intent in enacting the foreru”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. First National City Bank New York v. Smith

2. “Jurisdiction of offenses and suits The district courts of the United States, and the United States courts of any Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder . . . Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or rules and regulations thereunder, or to enjoin any violation of such chapter or rules and regulations, may be brought in any such district or in the district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business, and process in such cases may be served in any other district of which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found . .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. RONSON CORPORATION v. LIQUIFIN AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT Et Al. Appeal of FRANKLIN NATIONAL BANK and Franklin New York Corporation

3. “[Mjovant’s position ... is that a federal judge who either has or has had reorganization responsibilities is, as a matter of law, thence forward disqualified from presiding over any other matter collateral to that proceeding on the subject matter there involved if he might be called upon to make a ruling that might in any manner adversely affect the debt- or then in reorganization . . . This court does not understand this to be the law. [F]or the Judge of this Court to now step aside on the basis of the tardy technical disqualification now urged and transfer this massive proceeding to another judge would be a disservice to the litigants, the attorneys and the other overburdened judges of this district of such a magnitude as to be unthinkable.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Goss v. Crossley (In re Hawaii Corp.)