Orr v. Shell Oil Co.’s Empirical Analysis
1943
Citation profile
8 federal appellate · 51 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 69 later decisions — most recently August 2006 · most notably Martin v. Bengue, Inc. (1957), Clifford Griggs v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, a Corporation (1975)
8 federal appellate · 51 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Guthrie v. City of St. Charles · Hoelzel v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. · Scott v. Missouri Pacific Railroad · McLeod Ex Rel. McLeod v. Linde Air Products Co. · Farley v. Edward E. Tower Co.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 69 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““The rule is now well settled that a duty is imposed upon the one who furnishes an article which he knows, or ought to know, to be peculiarly dangerous to give notice of its character or bear the natural consequences of his failure to do so. This rule originated as an exception to the general rule of nonliability where no privity of contract exists, and was applied in cases involving injuries from poisonous drugs, chemicals, explosives or articles inherently dangerous to person or property. See Callahan v. Warne, 40 Mo. 131 ; Heizer v. Kingsland & Douglass Mfg. Co., 110 Mo. 605 , 19 S. W. 630 , 15 L. ER A. 821, 33 Am. St. Rep. 482 ; Lenz v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 88 N. H. 212, 186 A. 329 . The rule has been extended to cover articles not only inherently dangerous in their nature, but dangerous because of the use to which they are to be put by whoever may use them for the purpose intended. See Annotation 17 A. L. R. 683. McLeod v. Linde Air Products Co., 318 Mo. 397 , 1 S. W. 2d 122 . The danger is none the less inherent because it is brought into action by some external force. Farley v. Edward E. Tower Co., 271 Mass. 230 , 171 N. E. 639 , 86 A. L. R. 941. The basis of liability is not in contract but arises from a social responsibility to use due care to avoid injuring those persons likely to be injured if such care is not used.” 177 S. W. 2d at page 612 .”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if the supplier a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be danger ous for the use for which it is supplied, and b) has no reason to believe that those for which use the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“One who supplies a chattel to others to use for any purpose is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous character in so far as it is known to him, or of facts which to his knowledge make it likely to be dangerous, if, but only if, he has no reason to expect that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will discover its condition and realize the danger involved. It is not necessary for the supplier to inform those for whose use the chattel is supplied of a condition which a mere casual looking over will disclose, unless the circumstances under which the chattel is supplied are such as to make it likely that even so casual an inspection will not be made. However, the condition, although readily observable, may be one which only persons of special experience would realize to be dangerous. In such case, if the supplier, having such special experience, knows that the condition involves danger and has no reason to believe that those who use it will have such special experience as will enable them to perceive the danger, he is required to inform them of the risk of which he himself knows and which he has no reason to suppose that they will realize.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.