Volume 352 — North Carolina Reports

<bold>Libel and Slander — Report of suspected child abuse — presumption of good</bold> <bold>faith — actual malice</bold> <block_quote> Although plaintiff-customer contends defendant-salesperson reported plaintiff's behavior of suspected child abuse or neglect to the Department of Social Services based on retaliatory motives, the Court of Appeals erred in reversing summary judgment in favor of defendants on the slander per se claim because: (1) N.C.G.S. § 7A-543 (now N.C.G.S. § <cross_reference>7B-301</cross_reference>) imposes an affirmative duty for anyone with cause to suspect child abuse or neglect to report that conduct; (2) N.C.G.S. § 7A-550 (now N.C.G.S. § <cross_reference>7B-309</cross_reference>) provides immunity from liability to those who act in accordance with the reporting statute and presumes the reporter's good faith; and (3) plaintiff did not meet her burden under N.C.G.S. § <cross_reference>8C-1</cross_reference>, Rule 301 to show defendant's bad faith or actual malice.</block_quote>

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 132 N.C. App. 329, 511 S.E.2d 37 (1999), affirming after rehearing its earlier unanimous opinion, 130 N.C. App. 47, 502 S.E.2d 15 (1998), in which it affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part an order entered 15 November 1996 by Stanback, J., in Superior Court, Durham County. Heard in the Supreme Court 13 March 2000.