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352 So. 2d 195

Docket No. 59744.

State v. Jackson

STATE of Louisiana v. Leo JACKSON.

Supreme Court of Louisiana

Decided November 14, 1977.

Supreme Court of Louisiana · decided 1977-11-14

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“"This court has held to be admissible, for limited purposes, proof of other crimes exhibiting almost the identical modus operandi or system, committed in close proximity in time and place. State v. Jones, 332 So.2d 466 (La.1976) (a pre-Prieur trial); State v. Price, 325 So.2d 780 (La.1976); State v. Vince, 305 So.2d 916 (La.1974); State v. Lawrence, 294 So.2d 476 (La.1974). "As the jurisprudence has clarified, the other crime must be distinctively similar in system, State v. Slayton, 338 So.2d 694 (La.1976), State v. Waddles, 336 So.2d 810 (La.1976), State v. Hicks, 301 So.2d 357 (La.1974)—i. e., `so peculiarly distinctive that one must logically say that they [the two crimes] are the work of the same person,' State v. Lee, 340 So.2d 1339,1345 (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Dennis) (La.1976). Furthermore, the proof of the other crime as part of the system must be relevant to prove a fact of consequence to the accused's present innocence or guilt (independent of the inadmissible purpose to infer that the accused committed the present crime because he had committed the other one). State v. Ledet, 345 So.2d 474 (La.1977); State v. Frederick, 340 So.2d 1353 (La.1976); State v. Gaines, 340 So.2d 1294 (La.1977); State v. Hicks, 301 So.2d 357 (La.1974); State v. Harrison, 291 So.2d 782 (La. 1974). "Of course, as the cited decisions emphasize, not only must the other-crime evidence first be found relevant to a material fact actually at issue, but the probative value must outweigh”

quoted by 4 later decisions, including State v. Lewis, 354 So. 2d 1007 - State v. Frentz

“(1) The State shall within a reasonable time before trial furnish in writing to the defendant a statement of the acts or offenses it intends to offer, describing same with the general particularity required of an indictment or information. No such notice is required as to evidence of offenses which are a part of the res gestae, or convictions used to impeach defendant’s testimony. (2) In the written statement the State shall specify the exception to the general exclusionary rule upon which it relies for the admissibility of the evidence of other acts or offenses. |7(3) Prerequisite to the admissibility of the evidence is a showing by the State that the evidence of other crimes is not merely repetitive and cumulative, is not a subterfuge for depicting the defendant’s bad character or his propensity for bad behavior, and that it serves the actual purpose for which it is offered.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 75 So. 3d 17 - State v. Willis

Relies on 345 So. 2d 474 - State v. Ledet · 332 So. 2d 466 - State v. Jones · 305 So. 2d 916 - State v. Vince

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1977-11-14

How this case has been cited

Cited by 29 later decisions — most recently November 2016 · most notably 372 So. 2d 1024 - State v. Hatcher (1979), 976 So. 2d 109 - State v. Lee (2008)

29 state decisions

9019771980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Maurice T. Hattier, Orleans Indigent Defender Program, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.

¶2William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Connick, Dist. Atty., William L. Brockman, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

¶3*196 TATE, Justice.

¶4The defendant was convicted of distribution of heroin, La.R.S. 40:966, and sentenced to life imprisonment. His appeal raises four assignments of error. We find merit in Assignment 1, relating to the improper admission of other-crime evidence, and therefore reverse.

¶5The defendant is charged with distribution of heroin on March 20, 1974. This is a crime requiring only general criminal intent; such intent is established by mere proof of voluntary distribution. La.R.S. 40:966; State v. Clark, 338 So.2d 690 (La. 1976).

¶6Over objection, the state introduced proof of a similar heroin-distribution offense on March 18, 1974, two days earlier.[1] The state concedes (noting its disagreement with such jurisprudence) that, under clarifying jurisprudence decided subsequent to the ruling below, the other-crime evidence could not be introduced to prove "intent" or "guilty knowledge," in the absence of a defense that the street sale was done without knowledge of the illegality of the substance. State v. Frederick, 340 So.2d 1353 (La.1976); State v. Slayton, 338 So.2d 694 (La.1976); State v. Clark, 338 So.2d 690 (La.1976).

¶7Nevertheless, the state argues, the other-crime evidence was admissible as proof of "system."

¶8

(1)

¶9This court has held to be admissible, for limited purposes, proof of other crimes exhibiting almost the identical modus operandi or system, committed in close proximity in time and place. State v. Jones, 332 So.2d 466 (La.1976) (a pre-Prieur trial); State v. Price, 325 So.2d 780 (La.1976); State v. Vince, 305 So.2d 916 (La.1974); State v. Lawrence, 294 So.2d 476 (La.1974).

¶10As the jurisprudence has clarified, the other crime must be distinctively similar in system, State v. Slayton, 338 So.2d 694 (La.1976), State v. Waddles, 336 So.2d 810 (La.1976), State v. Hicks, 301 So.2d 357 (La.1974)—i. e., "so peculiarly distinctive that one must logically say that they [the two crimes] are the work of the same person," State v. Lee, 340 So.2d 1339, 1345 (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Dennis) (La.1976). Furthermore, the proof of the other crime as part of the system must be relevant to prove a fact of consequence to the accused's present innocence or guilt (independent of the inadmissible purpose to infer that the accused committed the present crime because he had committed the other one). State v. Ledet, 345 So.2d 474 (La.1977); State v. Frederick, 340 So.2d 1353 (La.1976); State v. Gaines, 340 So.2d 1294 (La.1977); State v. Hicks, 301 So.2d 357 (La.1974); State v. Harrison, 291 So.2d 782 (La.1974).

¶11Of course, as the cited decisions emphasize, not only must the other-crime evidence first be found relevant to a material fact actually at issue, but the probative value must outweigh its prejudicial effect. See State v. Ledet, 345 So.2d 474 (La.1977). In emphasizing the limited purposes for which other-crime evidence may be used, and the limitations upon its use even for such purposes, Ledet summarizes the governing values in the exercise of the trial judge's limited discretion to admit it, 345 So.2d 478:

¶12"… Because of the substantial risk that the extraneous evidence may detract from the constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime charged, other crimes can only be admitted after a `showing by the State that the evidence of other crimes is not merely repetitive and cumulative, is not a subterfuge for depicting the defendant's bad behavior, and that it serves the actual purpose for which offered.'"

¶13

(2)

¶14In the present case, the two transactions do not meet these tests.

¶15*197 In the first place, they are no more peculiarly distinctive in nature than are any other street transactions by which an agent purchases a small quantity of illegal drugs from a willing seller. In the second place, the evidence was unduly prejudicial, without overriding probative effect.

¶16More important, however, evidence of the earlier crime of March 18, 1976 serves no probative purpose with regard to an issue of the present (March 20) prosecution—except the prohibited purpose of showing that the accused may have committed the present crime because he is a bad man who committed a similar crime in the past. State v. Frederick, 340 So.2d 1353, 1357 (La.1976).

¶17We must therefore reverse the present conviction and remand for a new trial.

¶18

(3)

¶19Before doing so, however, we must note a serious issue raised by Assignment 2, which we do not reach in the present prosecution. By it, the appointed attorney representing the indigent made a substantial showing that he was improperly denied a continuance because, due to his client's confinement at Angola because of an earlier conviction (see footnote 1), he had been unable to confer with his client to prepare a defense except for a few minutes on two earlier occasions, when the client had been transported from Angola for a court appearance.

¶20However, the client was immediately transported back, without affording the appointed counsel (who was responsible for the defense of several other prosecutions in the same section at the same hearing) a reasonable opportunity to confer with his client to prepare for defense.

¶21Because of the reversal necessitated by the earlier assignment however, we do not reach the merits of Assignment 2.

¶22

Decree

¶23For the reasons assigned we reverse the defendant's conviction and sentence, and we remand this case to the district court for a new trial in accordance with law.

¶24REVERSED AND REMANDED.

¶25SANDERS, C. J., and SUMMERS, J., dissent.

¶26MARCUS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

¶27MARCUS, Justice (dissenting).

¶28In order to show intent, evidence is admissible of similar acts. La.R.S. 15:445. Moreover, where the offense is one of system, evidence of similar offenses is admissible for the purpose of showing guilty knowledge and intent. La.R.S. 15:446. In the instant case, I consider that the evidence of the similar offense (March 18, 1974, heroin distribution offense) was admissible to prove knowledge, system, or intent. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

NOTES

¶29[1] The record reflects that the defendant had earlier been convicted of the March 18 offense and sentenced to life imprisonment.

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