¶1(dissenting) Mr. Justice Spiegel and I are unable to agree with the views expressed in the majority opinion which bear heavily upon the fundamental rights of an accused. We believe that (1) the prosecutor’s interference with the defendants’ attempted interview of Moore, and (2) the judge’s withholding of Moore’s grand jury testimony from the defendants require that the judgments in all the cases be reversed and the verdicts set aside. We further believe that (3) the “John Doe” indictment under which Connor was convicted must be quashed.
¶21. In Commonwealth v. Balliro, 349 Mass. 505, 516, this court, citing art. 12 of the Declaration of Eights of our Constitution, stated that “counsel for a defendant should be accorded, as of right, an opportunity to interview prospective witnesses held in the custody of the Commonwealth. Witnesses belong neither. to the Commonwealth nor to the defence” (emphasis supplied). “It is too plain to be labored that the interviewing of prospective witnesses is an essential part of the preparation of a case for trial.” Id. at 517-518.
¶3The defendants’ attempt to interview Moore was made four months after our decisión in the Ballirocase. During the attempted interview the defence was not permitted to elicit from Moore an answer to any question which the prosecutor did not approve. We see no difference in principle between refusing to grant, a defendant physical access *215to the witness (Commonwealth v. Balliro, 349 Mass. 505, 516) and refusing to permit defendants, as was done in the present case, to get answers to questions put to the witness. In either case, the right to interview the witness is unwarrantably controlled by the prosecution.
¶4At the court hearing which followed the abortive interview, the prosecutor attempted to justify his actions by unsupported allegations that Moore was in constant danger of reprisals from the defendants. That this is not a sufficient reason for depriving a defendant of his right to interview a prospective witness was clearly stated in the Ballirocase, where the risks to the witnesses were not merely alleged but were evidenced by past acts of the defendants: “That the witnesses, as the Commonwealth argues, were ‘victims’ of the acts of the defendants does not alter the defendants’ rights.” 349 Mass, at 518.
¶5We believe, therefore, that where, as in the present cases, it appears that the prosecutor has interfered with the defendants’ attempts to interview a witness in protective custody, the judge is under an affirmative duty to neutralize the effect of the prosecutor’s interference by appropriate action. The judge could have done so by granting the defendants’ pre-trial requests to examine Moore’s grand jury testimony. We are now, however, left to speculate what the posture of the defence would have been if the prosecution had not interfered with the defendants’ efforts to interview the witness, or if the judge had taken appropriate action to counteract the prosecutor’s interference. Commonwealth v. Balliro, 349 Mass. 505, 517. In our view, the defendants have been so prejudiced in the preparation and presentation of their defence as to require that new trials be granted.
¶62. The defendants were entitled to examine Moore’s grand jury testimony. At the trial, Moore was the key witness for the prosecution. The fate of all the defendants hung on her testimony. The inconsistency between Moore’s grand jury testimony and Moore’s trial testimony was not merely alleged, but was proved in open court. Cf. Com*216monwealth v. Abbott Engr. Inc. 351 Mass. 568, 578-579. Her public confession that she committed perjury before the grand jury does not establish the truth of her testimony before the trial jury. In these circumstances, the defendants’ “particularized need” for inspecting Moore’s grand jury testimony and their consequent right to do so is self-evident. Commonwealth v. Ladetto, 349 Mass. 237, 244-245. See Commonwealth v. Giles, ante, 1, 18-19, 22. United States v. Youngblood, 379 F. 2d 365 (2d Cir.). Nothing less than affording defence counsel fair opportunity to examine and evaluate Moore’s grand jury testimony could suffice. “The determination of what may be useful to the defense can properly and effectively be made only by an advocate.” Dennis v. United States, 384 U. S. 855, 875.
¶7The narrow issue, therefore, is whether the judge, in permitting the defendants merely to call the stenographer, was granting the defendants the equivalent of what they were entitled to and had requested. We think not. The judge repeatedly denied the defendants’ requests to examine Moore’s grand jury testimony. When the judge did authorize the defendants to call the stenographer, he expressly refused to make the grand jury minutes available to counsel even though the defendants’ particularized need for them had been established. It can hardly be said, therefore, that the judge, in permitting the defendants to call the stenographer, thereby intended that they should be able to accomplish what he had often expressly denied them. The defendants were not required to accept less than that to which they were entitled. Having seasonably saved their exceptions, they should now be entitled to examine Moore’s grand jury testimony for purposes of a retrial.
¶83. We believe there was error in the denial of Connor’s motion to quash the indictment which, several days prior to Connor’s arrest, was returned against “John Doe, the true name and a more particular description of the said John Doe being to the said jurors unknown.” We recognize that the judge who denied the motion to quash under*217standably relied upon the holding in Commonwealth v. Gedzium, 259 Mass. 453. Our opinion is, first, that the Gedsium case cannot withstand analysis on the constitutional issue, and second, that the Gedsium case is distinguishable from and does not support the case before us.
¶9Under art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights of our Constitution “ ‘no person . . . shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime . . . unless he shall have been previously charged on the presentment or indictment of a grand jury.’ 2 Kent Cor. 12” (emphasis supplied). Jones v. Robbins, 8 Cray, 329, 344-345. The fundamental prerequisite to a valid indictment, that the grand jury intend to indict a specific person whose identity is known to them, is immutable. An indictment returned by the grand jury must be “an indictment found in the usual course of proceedings in pursuance of the methods of conducting the deliberations of grand jurors established by generations of procedure in England and in this Commonwealth.” Commonwealth v. Harris, 231 Mass. 584, 587. Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray, 329, 342-343. Commonwealth v. Woodward, 157 Mass. 516.
¶10Tested by the foregoing constitutional principles, the indictment under which Connor was tried and convicted was fatally defective. The grand jury’s averment under oath in the indictment that no better description of the person intended to be indicted was known to them than the name “John Doe” forecloses the possibility that they knew the identity of the person they intended to indict. The name “John Doe” gives no clue to identity. Standing alone it is synonymous with anonymity. The indictment of John Doe is the indictment of anyone. The indictment of anyone is the indictment of no one. The indictment of no one is an indictment in blank. The indictment as returned, therefore, subjected Connor to a public trial before the grand jury had determined in the first instance that probable cause existed to believe that he committed the crime charged in the indictment. Because the defect is apparent on the *218face of the indictment the objection was properly raised by motion to quash. G. L. c. 278, § 17.
¶11We do not believe that G. L. c. 277, § 19, authorizes the procedure followed in Connor’s case. We think the statute applies only where the indictment clearly shows that the grand jury intended to indict a particular person whose identity was known to them although his true name may not have been known. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dedham, 16 Mass. 141; Commonwealth v. Lewis, 1 Met. 151; Turns v. Commonwealth, 6 Met. 224, 235; Commonwealth v. Butler, 1 Allen, 4; Commonwealth v. Darcey, 12 Allen, 539; Commonwealth v. Fredericks, 119 Mass. 199. To hold that the “John Doe” indictment under which Connor was tried and convicted is authorized by G. L. c. 277, § 19, would effectively nullify the limitations on criminal proceedings contained in G. L. c. 277, § 63. The procedure would permit a grand jury to return an indictment whenever they had probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed without any inquiry into who committed the crime. It would no longer suffice that a person who has committed a crime remain undetected for the period of time set forth in G. L. c. 277, § 63. It would also be necessary that the acts constituting the crime likewise be not detected for the prescribed period.
¶12In any event, the failure of the indictment to satisfy the constitutional requirement that the grand jury determine in the first instance that probable cause existed to believe that Connor committed the crime charged cannot be cured by any action allegedly authorized by G. L. c. 277, § 19. It is axiomatic that a constitutional guaranty cannot be eradicated by statute. “The legislature may change . . . [the indictment] in form, but cannot change the substance of its material averments without impinging upon constitutional guarantees ’ ’ (italics in original). State v. Terry, 109 Mo. 601, 614.
¶13What we have said with respect to the “John Doe” indictment under which Connor was tried and convicted applies with equal force to the “John Doe” indictment in *219Commonwealth v. Gedzium. In the Gedziumease, the court felt able to leap the constitutional barrier by the statement that “Such allowance [of the motion to enter the true name of the defendant upon the record] presupposes the finding by the court of all the facts essential thereto to the end that no injustice be done to any defendant” (p. 461). In the case before us, there is no evidence that would justify our indulging in such a statement. The stark reality of the situation is that we have an indictment for murder returned by the grand jury in blank, leaving it to the prosecutor later to identify the person to be charged, and to enter his name, with the acquiescence of the judge, on the record.
¶14Because the “John Doe” indictment under which Connor has been tried was fatally defective, all proceedings taken in reliance upon the indictment are void. To say that a guilty verdict rendered by a petit jury cures the fatal defect in the indictment would destroy the right of every citizen to the interposition of a grand jury in the first instance, guaranteed by art. 12 of the Declaration of Bights. Con-nor made timely objection to the procedure. Accordingly, in the case against Connor the judgment should be reversed, the verdict set aside, and the indictment quashed.