Shoemaker v. Smith’s Empirical Analysis
1999
Citation profile
5 federal appellate · 28 district · 113 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 156 later decisions — most recently November 2018 · most notably Okwa v. Harper (2000), DiPino v. Davis (1999)
5 federal appellate · 28 district · 113 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))
Relies on Harlow v. Fitzgerald · Graham v. Connor · Pierson v. Ray · Wood v. Strickland · Johnson v. Jones
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 156 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“conduct 'characterized by evil or wrongful motive, intent to injure, knowing and deliberate wrongdoing, ill-will or fraud.'”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage““[T]he General Assembly ... clearly and expressly retained a subjective element for immunity purposes. * * * The Legislature had decided that, when State personnel act maliciously, they, and not the State, must bear the risk. The predominant and laudable public policy is to discourage State personnel from acting with malice in the performance of their public duties. * ' * * “The Court of Special Appeals has long applied ... some standard of ‘actual malice’ in defining ‘malice’ for the purposes of ... immunity under ... State and local tort claims laws. “This, we believe is the appropriate test — the one the Legislature intended to be applied.””
3 later decisions quote this exact passage“[t]he question raised for purposes of immunity under the State Tort Claims Act is whether a jury could reasonably find that [the deputies] conduct, given all of the existing and antecedent circumstances, was motivated by ill will, by an improper motive, or by an affirmative intent to injure the boys ... that motive or animus may exist even when the conduct is objectively reasonable. If it does, there is no immunity under the State Tort Claims Act.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.