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← 354 Ark. 140 - Stivers v. State

Stivers v. State’s Empirical Analysis

2003

Citation profile

60
cited by 60 later decisions
1
states following
March 2026
most recently cited

60 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 60 later decisions — most recently March 2026 · most notably Jackson v. State (2004), Williams v. State (2005)

60 state decisions

440200320102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Dixon v. State · Buckley v. State · Jones v. State · Ramaker v. State · Williams v. State

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 60 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “This court reviews issues of statutory interpretation de novo, as it is for this court to decide the meaning of a statute. See Stivers v. State, 354 Ark. 140 , 118 S.W.3d 558 (2003). We construe criminal statutes strictly, resolving any doubts in favor of the defendant. See id. We also adhere to the basic rule of statutory construction, which 14is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. See id. We construe the statute just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language, and if the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion to resort to rules of statutory interpretation. See id. Additionally, in construing any statute, we place it beside other statutes relevant to the subject matter in question and ascribe meaning and effect to be derived from the whole. See id.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “Clearly, when the General Assembly desires to incorporate a mens rea element into the statutes governing traffic accidents, it can and, as seen in § 27-53-201 (b), has done so. Here, the legislature clearly intended to dispense with any intent requirement in § 27-53-101. Therefore, the trial court did not err in declining to engraft an element of intent into the statute, or in refusing Stivers’s proffered instruction.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.