Moran v. Mitchell’s Empirical Analysis
1973
Citation profile
18 federal appellate · 2 district · 3 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 35 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently June 2012 · most notably Allen v. McCurry (1980), Meadows v. Evans (1977)
18 federal appellate · 2 district · 3 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (Class Action Fairness Act of 2005) · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))
Relies on Ex Parte: Edward T Young · Monroe v. Pape · Fay v. Noia · Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation · Emich Motors Corporation v. General Motors Corporation
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 35 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[I]t is asserted that the defendants in this action were only witnesses in the criminal proceedings, not parties. This argument, though superficially appealing, does not stand under close scrutiny. While a criminal action is brought in the name of the State, all of the law enforcement officers who worked toward the prosecution are, in essence, parties to the action. The litigation is, in a very real sense, between them and the defendant.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““if a successful state prosecution, based upon the use of information obtained by violating the defendant’s constitutional rights, could bar a civil rights action against the police for violating his rights, either by analogy to the law of malicious prosecution or on theories of res judicata or estoppel by judgment, the Civil Rights Act would, in many cases, be a dead letter.” 439 F.2d at 1288 .”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Mastracchio v. Ricci“Since the entry of a default, as opposed to an actual default judgment, is both interlocutory and technical in nature, a court should ordinarily set one aside unless the movant fails to present a reasonable excuse for his neglect or fails to show he has a meritorious defense to the merits of the action.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.