Dupwe v. Wallace’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 2 district · 74 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 85 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “1. A party must assume a position clearly inconsistent with a position taken in an earlier case, or with a position taken in the same case; 2. A party must assume the inconsistent position with the intent to manipulate the judicial process to gain an unfair advantage; 3. A party must have successfully maintained the position in an earlier proceeding such that the court relied upon the position taken; and 4. The integrity of the judicial process of at least one court must be impaired or injured by the inconsistent positions taken.”

   9 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. McWhorter v. McWhorter · Mitchell v. Ramsey

2. “The best beginning point in our analysis is Muncrief [v. Green, 251 Ark. 580 , 473 S.W.2d 907 (1971) ] where this court stated that the appellee in that case was asserting judicial estoppel, “by which a party may be prevented from taking inconsistent position in successive cases with the same adversary.” [[Image here]] In discussing judicial estoppel in Daley [v. City of Little Rock, 36 Ark.App. 80 , 818 S.W.2d 259 (1991)], the court of appeals cited to Rinke [v. Weedman, 232 Ark. 900 , 341 S.W.2d 44 (1960) ], for the proposition that the doctrine of judicial estoppel is of “vague application.” [[Image here]] In House [v. Wakefield, 42 Tenn. 325 (1865) ], the Tennessee Supreme Court noted that the judgment at issue was: a judgment regularly rendered upon the solemn admissions of the parties made in the court of the suit, and with the view of such admission being acted upon by the court. [[Image here]] The principle laid out in House and characterized as “judicial estoppel” in C.J.S. is not a principle unfamiliar to this court. J& • • • In Cox v. Harris, 64 Ark. 213, 215 , 41 S.W. 426 (1897), this court stated, “It is a familiar principle of law that one is not, as a rule, allowed to avail himself of inconsistent positions in a litigation concerning the same subject matter.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Parker v. Advanced Portable X-Ray, LLC

3. “Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, as distinguished from equitable estoppel by inconsistency, a party is estopped merely by the fact of having alleged or admitted in his pleadings in a former proceeding under oath the contrary of the assertion sought to be made. However, such estoppel does not operate if the original averment was made inconsiderately or mistakenly; it must have been made knowingly and free of inducement by the opposite party.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Cox v. Miller