Melgar v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

40 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 40 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(d)(1) A person who is convicted under subsection (b)(1) or subsection (b)(2) of this section or of conspiracy to violate subsection (b)(1) or subsection (b)(2) of this section shall be sentenced to imprisonment for the term allowed by law, but, in any event, not less than 25 years if the person previously: (i) Has served at least 1 term of confinement of at least 180 days in a correctional institution as a result of a conviction of a previous violation of this section or § 286A of this article; and (ii) Has been convicted twice, where the convictions do not arise from a single incident: 1. Under subsection (b)(1) or subsection (b)(2) of this section; 2. Of conspiracy to violate subsection (b)(1) or subsection (b)(2) of this section; 3. Of an offense under the laws of another state, the District of Columbia, or the United States that would be a violation of subsection (b)(1) or subsection (b)(2) of this section if committed in this State; or 4. Of any combination of these offenses. (2) Neither the sentence required under paragraph (1) of this subsection nor any part of it may be suspended, and the person may not be eligible for parole except in accordance with Article 31B, § 11 of the Code.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 180 Md. App. 440 - Stevenson v. State · Deville v. State

2. “[T]he public policy goal of affording criminal offenders a meaningful chance at rehabilitation before subjecting them to mandatory, enhanced penalties and the incomplete availability of rehabilitative services to pretrial detainees underscore the purposefulness of the Legislature’s choice of the phrase “as a result of conviction.” In our view, this distinct statutory phrase reflects the legislative intent that time in pretrial detention neither suffice nor in any degree supplement the statutory prerequisite of a minimum 180 day term of prior confinement for imposing an enhanced penalty upon a three-time drug offender under § 286.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 180 Md. App. 440 - Stevenson v. State · 130 Md. App. 135 - Veney v. State

3. ““[A]n enhanced penalty statute, is highly penal and must be strictly construed so that the defendant is only subject to punishment contemplated by the statute. When doubt exists regarding the punishment imposed by a statute, the rule of lenity instructs that a court ‘not interpret a ... criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what [the legislature] intended.’ ””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Deville v. State · Melton v. State