Ferris v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

287 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 289 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Once the purpose of [the traffic] stop has been fulfilled, the continued detention of the car and the occupants amounts to a second detention. See Royer, 460 U.S. at 500 , 103 S.Ct. at 1325-26 . Thus, once the underlying basis for the initial traffic stop has concluded, a police-driver encounter which implicates the Fourth Amendment is constitutionally permissible only if either (1) the driver consents to the continuing intrusion or (2) the officer has, at a minimum, a reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”

   20 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 236 Md. App. 456 - Carter v. State · 230 Md. App. 487 - Santos v. State

2. “the time and place of the encounter, the number of officers present and whether they were uniformed, whether the police removed the person to a different location or isolated him or her from others, whether the person was informed that he or she was free to leave, whether the police indicated that the person was suspected of a crime, whether the police retained the person’s documents, and whether the police exhibited threatening behavior or physical contact that would suggest to a reasonable person that he or she was not free to leave.”

   10 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. State v. Rucker · Cox v. State

3. ““A seizure can occur by means of physical force, or show of authority along with submission to the assertion of authority. [California v.] Hodari D., 499 U.S. [621,] 625-26, 111 S.Ct. [1547,]1550 [, 113 L.Ed.2d 690, 696-697 (1991)] (noting that police officers could affect a seizure of a person by either physical force or by a show of authority along with submission to the assertion of authority); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 1879 n. 16, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (‘Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a “ ‘seizure’ has occurred.’ ”). If a reasonable person would have felt free to leave, no seizure occurred. Conversely, if a reasonable person would have felt compelled to stay, a seizure took place. The focus, then, is ‘whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.’ Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436 , 111 S.Ct. at 2387 . The key inquiry has also been characterized as whether ‘the police conduct would “have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.’ ” Id. at 437 , 111 S.Ct. at 2387 (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 569 , 108 S.Ct. 1975, 1977 , 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988)).””

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. State v. Rucker · 146 Md. App. 327 - Graham v. State