Quartana v. Jenks’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

7 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 7 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““... This position is contrary to the law. R.S. 7:119(1) and (5) state respectively: ‘§ 119. Modes of discharging instrument ‘A negotiable instrument is discharged: ‘(1) By payment in due course by or on behalf of the principal debtor; :{s * :j< * * * ‘(5) When the principal debtor becomes the holder of the instrument at or after maturity in his own right.’ “See also, 11 Am.Jur.2d Bills and Notes § 911 (1963), which states: ‘[T]he endorsement and delivery of a negotiable promissory note by the payee to one of several joint and several makers after maturity and for valuable consideration completely extinguishes the obligation of the note. . .’ (emphasis supplied); also, 10 C.J.S. Bills and Notes § 449b(l)(a) (1938), wherein it is stated: ‘[Pjayment in due course of a promissory note by one of several joint makers to the payee or holder extinguishes the instrument and discharges the liability of the other makers thereon’ (emphasis supplied), and (b): ‘.. . Because payment by one joint maker discharges the instrument, . . . the joint maker who makes the payment cannot sue his comakers on the note, an assignment or indorsement of it to him by the payee not resuscitating it or vitalizing it in his hands as against his comaker. The remedy of the maker making the payment in such case is to sue for contribution . .. . ’ (Emphasis supplied) “Whenever a co-debtor has paid the entire common debt, he has the right to demand contribution from his co-debtors from their virile share. C.C”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 398 So. 2d 13 - Bourg v. Wiley

2. “On a new trial, if plaintiffs are found to be entitled to a judgment, then the judgment should be for 4/6 of the purchase price of the note ($24,698 × 4/6 = $16,465.33), less a credit of $2,217.37 for the proceeds of the judicial sale and an appropriate credit for the value of the lease, with legal interest from April 10, 1975, the date of the judicial demand, until paid and for all costs. Each of the four co-debtors is only liable for his virile share. Since the note was discharged, the 9½% interest from the date of payment and 20% attorney's fees provided therein are eliminated.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 436 So. 2d 1335 - Quartana v. Jenks

3. “1. The principal demand here cannot be tried by jury because it is a suit on an unconditional obligation to pay a specific sum of money. C.C.P. Art. 1733(2). According to C.C.P. Art. 1731 and the comments thereunder, a jury trial is not available on an incidental demand when the principal demand is not triable by jury.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sanders