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355 S.W.2d 149

Tippit v. Thomas

Court of Appeals of Kentucky

Decided March 9, 1962

Court of Appeals of Kentucky · decided 1962-03-09

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently May 1964

1 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““ * * * Even if the mittimus were before us and we could find error in it, the fact remains that appellant is confined by the efficacy of the judgment and not by virtue of the commitment. Glenn v. Porter, 292 Ky. 719 , 168 S.W.2d 32 .””

quoted by 1 later decision, including Nolan v. Thomas

Relies on Brown v. Hoblitzell · Cash v. Richards · Glenn, Workhouse Keeper v. Porter

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1962-03-09

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

WADDILL, Commissioner.

¶1Charles Tippit, a prisoner in Kentucky State Penitentiary, appeals from a judgment of the Lyon Circuit Court dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

¶2From the scanty record we gather that in 1959 appellant was found guilty in the Oldham Circuit Court of escape from La-Grange Reformatory while serving a three-year sentence there. Upon his conviction pursuant to KRS 432.390 he received an additional sentence of three years in the penitentiary to run consecutively with his former sentence.

¶3In his petition appellant contends that he is wrongfully detained because (1) the mit-timus under which he is held is predated, and (2) the court had no authority to “suspend a judgment sentence beyond the period of the judgment sentence.”

¶4The contents of the mittimus are not disclosed in the record, nor does appellant allege that he is detained under a void judgment. We have held that a petition for writ of habeas corpus is a collateral attack on the judgment by which a petitioner is imprisoned and that the writ will not lie unless it is established by the record that the judgment is void. Brown v. Hoblitzell, Ky., 307 S.W.2d 739; Owen v. Commonwealth, Ky., 280 S.W.2d 524. Even if the mittimus were before us and we could find error in it, the fact remains that appellant is confined by the efficacy of the judgment and not by virtue of the commitment. Glenn v. Porter, 292 Ky. 719, 168 S.W.2d 32.

¶5We further observe that the court had authority to suspend the second sentence until the first sentence was satisfied because KRS 432.390 specifically provides that confinement of an escapee under this section shall “commence after he has served out the sentence for which he was originally confined.”

¶6Judgment affirmed.

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