Anderson v. Spear’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

10 federal appellate · 4 district · 2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 29 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[W]hile the McConnell Court disavowed the theory that "the First Amendment erects a rigid barrier between express advocacy and so-called issue advocacy," it nonetheless left intact the ability of courts to make distinctions between express advocacy and issue advocacy, where such distinctions are necessary to cure vagueness and overbreadth in statutes which regulate more speech than that for which the legislature has established a significant governmental interest.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 161 Wash. 2d 470 - Voters Education Committee v. Public Disclosure Commission · Vec v. State Public Disclosure Com'n

2. “We need only consider how large Kentucky’s 500-foot barrier is to recognize the degree to which the restriction im pinges on free speech. At first blush, this buffer zone might appear to be five times as large as the 100-foot buffer zone [upheld] in Burson [v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 , 112 S.Ct. 1846 , 119 L.Ed.2d 5 (1992) ] — an expansion which alone might generate concern. But such a calculation fails to take into account the fact that the buffer zone runs in all directions from the building. Therefore, the buffer zone ... covers an area 25 times larger than the area at issue in Burson. The regulation has the potential to silence constitutionally protected speech for 18 acres around a voting booth, and guarantees that those wishing to express their opinions about the election are prohibited from coming within the length of 1 and 2/3 football fields of the polling place.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Lowden v. County of Clare

3. “Appellees [the Kentucky Board of Elections and Kentucky Registry of Election Finance] assert that their interpretation of the statute is entitled to Chevron deference. Appellees, however, cite no case for the proposition that Chevron deference applies to state agency determinations. Chevron deference is predicated on the idea that legislative gaps serve as delegations from Congress to administrative agencies, whose determinations are given controlling weight.... In order to demonstrate that such deference is due to the Kentucky Registry of Election Finance, the agency must, at the very least, establish under Kentucky law that the legislature intends ambiguities or gaps to be treated as delegations to administrative agencies. The agency makes no attempt to do so, and accordingly any claim to Chevron deference must fail.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Bryan v. Fawkes