Eagles, Ltd. v. American Eagle Foundation’s Empirical Analysis
356 F.3d 724 · 2004
Citation profile
20 federal appellate · 2 district · 1 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 39 later decisions — most recently July 2022 · most notably Audi AG v. D'Amato (2006), Dixon v. Clem (2007)
20 federal appellate · 2 district · 1 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (§ 35 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act)) · 15 U.S.C. § 1119 (§ 37 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act)) · 28 U.S.C. § 1927
Relies on Fogerty Fantasy Inc · Russel William Burket v. Ronald Angelone, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections · Arban v. West Publishing Corp. · Ridder v. City of Springfield · Conopco, Inc. v. Campbell Soup Co.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 39 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[B]ecause the question of ERISA pre-emption of state law claims is one of law, it also is assessed de novo. "). 63 We will assume without deciding that the abuse-of-discretion standard applies in these circumstances because we conclude that the district court's decision must be reversed in part under even the more deferential standard of review. Under that standard, we will reverse the district court only if we have "a definite and firm conviction that the trial court committed a clear error of judgment.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Gnesys, Inc. v. Greene · Briscoe“the prospect of dismissal of the PTO opposition was not properly before the district court because [the movant] raised the issue for the first time in its motion for reconsideration. [The mov-ant] failed to raise the argument as a counterclaim to the infringement action. Hence, according to the procedural posture of the case and by [the movant’s] own admissions, its argument for dismissal is not based on the merits but on an estoppel theory. As the district court correctly pointed out, estoppel issues are ordinarily enforced by awaiting a second action in which they are pleaded and proved by the party asserting estoppel. The PTO, not the district court, must determine the preclusive effect ...”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“[a]ny attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Dixon v. Clem
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.