Davis v. Cox’s Empirical Analysis
356 F.3d 76 · 2004
Citation profile
9 federal appellate · 14 district ·
Relationships
Applies 11 U.S.C. § 301 · 11 U.S.C. § 362 · 11 U.S.C. § 522 · 11 U.S.C. § 523 · 11 U.S.C. § 541 · 11 U.S.C. § 544 · 28 U.S.C. § 158
Relies on Butner v. United States · Distajo v. Doctor's Associates, Inc. · In Re Watman · In Re Questions Submitted by United States Dist. Ct. · Weiss McGahren v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Company
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 46 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Cox contends that the escrow funds could not have been “effectively attached” as the bankruptcy court concluded because the majority of the funds were exempt from attachment under Maine law. As a result, Cox argues, the exempt property in the escrow funds passed unencumbered into the bankruptcy estate when he filed his petition. Cox’s argument is flawed. While under Maine law certain property is exempt from attachment, 14 M.R.S.A. § 4422, the property at issue here was not attached. It is true that the bankruptcy court said the property was “effectively attached” when it was placed in custodia legis, but it was not actually attached. The bankruptcy court was merely analogizing property held in custodia legis for the benefit and protection of an individual to that individual’s attaching of the property in a hypothetical situation to secure a debt. But unlike a mere attachment, the court’s decision to place the property in custodia legis divested Cox of legal title and left him with only a contingent right to the property.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“The court here appointed the parties’ attorneys to hold certain funds in escrow pending the division of the marital assets. The attorneys were appointed to safeguard the property to prevent Cox [the debtor] from continuing to dissipate the funds in violation of a court order. When the state court directed the attorneys to place the money in escrow accounts and to disburse the money only upon an order of the court, the funds were placed in custodia legis and Cox was divested of legal title of the funds and title passed to the attorneys as officers of the court.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“Perlow v. Perlow, 128 B.R. 412, 415 (E.D.N.C.1991) (finding § 544 cut-off spouse’s right because under North Carolina law a judgment creditor's rights are superior to a spouses because the filing of divorce does not create a lien on specific marital property in favor of the spouse); Lawrence v. Lawrence, 237 B.R. 61, 78-79 (Bankr.D.N.J.1999) (finding § 544 cut-off spouse’s right because under New Jersey law a judgment creditor’s rights are superi- or to a spouse's if the lien was obtained prior to divorce judgment); Anderson v. Briglevich (In re Briglevich), 147 B.R. 1015, 1022 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1992) (concluding that non-debtor's unrecorded equitable interest in marital property cut-off by trustee’s strong arm powers); In re Vann, 113 B.R. 704, 706 (Bankr.D.Colo.1990) (stating that until a spouse takes affirmative action to perfect her interest in marital property the trustee's rights are superior under § 544).”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissente.g. In Re Pina
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.