In Re Pressure Sensitive Labelstock Antitrust Litigation’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 5 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “61. Having been a prior participant in coordinated conduct, Bemis and MACtac continued as willing participants in Defendants’ conspiracy to control prices in the market, by, among other things, agreeing to sell MACtac to UPM-Kymmene. Furthermore, simultaneous with Bemis’ agreement to sell its pressure sensitive labels business to UPM-Kymmene, UPM-Kymmene agreed to sell a European flexible pack- aging entity to Bemis on favorable terms, thus enabling Bemis to compensate for the loss of its sensitive labels business in North America by doubling its market share of its flexible packaging business in Europe. 62. Bemis was not an ignorant third party that was merely attempting to sell a business to UPM-Kymmene. In fact, Bemis and MACtac knew about UPM-Kymmene’s agreement with Avery to refrain from future price competition. By March 2001, Bemis and MACtac had concluded that a sale of MACtac to UPM-Kymmene would prevent a “pricing bloodbath for UPM as they try to capture North American market share” and “long-term damage” to the U.S. la-belstock market. Prior to the attempted closing of the sale, MACtac’s CEO, who had been selected by UPM-Kym-mene to head its North American label-stock business after the transaction, stated that the transaction should bring pricing “discipline” to UPM-Kymmene, a statement which would make no sense unless Bemis and MACtac knew of UPMKymmene’s collusive agreement with Avery to exercise price discipline.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 566 F. Supp. 2d 363 - In Re Pressure Sensitive Labelstock Antitrust Litigation

2. “[j]ust as an employment-discrimination plaintiff need not allege `circumstances that support an inference of discrimination,' there is no need for an antitrust plaintiff to allege a `plus factor [which] generates an inference of illegal price fixing.'”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp.

3. “a plaintiff `need not allege the existence of . . . plus factors in order to plead an antitrust cause of action'”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp.