State v. Olson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

21 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 22 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““If a defendant desires more comprehensive instructions on any phase of the case, he must submit written instructions with the request that they be given. State v. Bowe, 57 N.D. 89 , 220 N.W. 843 (1928). If a party fails to make such a request he cannot predicate error upon omissions in the charge given. Bowe, supra; see also Casper v. Spaulding, 78 Idaho 282 , 301 P.2d 1097 (1956); State, Road Comm’n v. Kendell, 20 Utah 2d 356 , 438 P.2d 178 (1968); Salt Lake & U.R. Co. v. Schramm, 56 Utah 53 , 189 P. 90 (1920). See, generally, 75 Am.Jur.2d, Trial, § 577, p. 562. Counsel will not be excused for failing to comply with a rule to present requested instructions in writing merely because the trial judge indicates in advance that he will not give the instruction requested. 75 Am.Jur.2d, Trial, § 580, p. 565; Gaspar v. Georgia Pacific Corp. 248 Cal.App.2d 248 , 56 Cal.Rptr. 243 (1967). The reason for the requirement for written instructions is that a trial judge must be allowed an opportunity to examine the substance of the requested instruction in order to facilitate a proper ruling on that request. The desired result is a ruling by the trial judge that will allow the instructions to fully and accurately inform the jury of the applicable law. Additionally, by requiring requested jury instructions to be in proper form, we, as a court of review, will be able to determine from the record the correctness of the trial court’s ruling. “Here, counsel failed to tender a written jury instr”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Rittenour v. Gibson · State v. Marks

2. ““These ... [public welfare offenses] do not fit neatly into any of such accepted classifications of common-law offenses, such as those against the state, the person, property, or public morals. Many of these offenses are not in the nature of positive aggressions or invasions, with which the common law so often dealt, but are in the nature of neglect where the law requires care, or inaction where it imposes a duty_ While such offenses do not threaten the security of the state in the manner of treason, they may be regarded as offenses against its authority, for their occurrence impairs the efficiency of controls deemed essential to the social order as presently constituted. In this respect, whatever the intent of the violator, the injury is the same, and the consequences are injurious or not according to fortuity. Hence, legislation applicable to such offenses, as a matter of policy, does not specify intent as a necessary element. The accused, if he does not will the violation, usually is in a position to prevent it with no more care than society might reasonably expect and no more exertion than it might reasonably exact from one who assumed his responsibilities. Also, penalties commonly are relatively small, and conviction does no grave damage to an offender’s reputation. Under such considerations, courts have turned to construing statutes and regulations which make no mention of intent as dispensing with it and holding that the guilty act alone makes out the crime.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. In Interest of KS · State v. Nygaard

3. ““After reviewing the record we conclude that even if Olson was prejudiced by the trial judge’s failure to instruct on the conscious-action issue, counsel’s failure to make a proper request is controlling. If the trial judge had so instructed we cannot say that the jury would have found Olson not guilty. Although an instruction on conscious action was not given, counsel was free to argue and did argue to the jury that Olson was unconscious after the accident and could not conform to the requirements of the law. We believe that the issue of conscious action was presented fairly to the jury.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Rittenour v. Gibson · State v. Marks