State v. DeBaere’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

27 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 27 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “As stated in State v. Morrison, 310 N.W.2d 135, 137 (Minn.1981): The key tests in determining admissibility of Spreigl evidence are whether the evidence is clear and convincing that defendant participated in the Spreigl offense, whether the Spreigl evidence is relevant and material to the state’s case, and whether the potential of the Spreigl evidence for unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. In determining relevance and materiality, the trial court should consider the issues in the case, the reasons and need for the evidence, and whether there is a sufficiently close relationship between the charged offense and the Spreigl offense in time, place, or modus operandi. * * * We have been flexible in applying this “test” on appeal, upholding admission notwithstanding a lack of closeness in time or place if the relevance of the evidence was otherwise clear. * * *”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Eberhardt · State v. Jackson

2. “(i) Testimony by two women that in the fall of 1979 defendant, whom they both knew but had never dated, came to their apartment early in the morning after a dance they had all attended and, after being admitted, attempted but failed to force each of them to have sexual intercourse with him before they joined forces and pushed him out of the apartment. They did not report the matter to the police. (ii) Testimony by a woman that on April 27, 1980, she met defendant at a dance and afterward he offered to drive her to a restaurant but instead drove her to a field where he raped her. Defendant was convicted of criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree (apparently as a result of a guilty plea) in connection with that incident. (iii) Testimony by a woman, who knew defendant but had not dated him, that early on the morning after Halloween, 1981, defendant, after gaining entrance to her apartment by saying that he needed to talk, attempted to force her to have sexual intercourse with him before she broke free, picked up a chair and ordered him to leave. She did not report the incident. (iv) Testimony by a female relative of defendant that early on January 1, 1982, defendant entered her room at her father’s house without permission, jumped into bed with her, and tried to force her to have sexual intercourse with him before he was scared off when a light flickered.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 171 Md. App. 223 - Hurst v. State

3. “In this case the defendant allegedly entered the house of a female acquaintance without consent, forced himself on her, and then, when complaint was made, claimed consent. The other-crime evidence showed a pattern of similar aggressive sexual behavior by defendant against other women in the community. Given our prior cases—e.g., State v. Morrison, 310 N.W.2d 135 (Minn.1981)—we believe that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence, which was highly relevant to the issue of consent.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 171 Md. App. 223 - Hurst v. State