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356 So. 2d 870

Docket No. 76-2317.

Mulder v. State

Ralph L. MULDER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided March 21, 1978.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1978-03-21

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“Accepting appellant's contentions would lead to absurd results. If the original plea negotiations including [sic] an understanding that a defendant would be placed on probation, and the court agreed, the court would then be unable to impose any prison sentence in the event probation was subsequently revoked. It cannot be said that the legislature intended to leave society without any recourse against those defendants who receive the benefit of the court's mercy by being placed on probation and, subsequently, violate the terms thereof. Appellant, having violated the terms of his probation, cannot now be heard to argue that the State is bound by the terms of an agreement which resulted in the initial imposition of probation.”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including 388 So. 2d 1017 - State v. Segarra, 625 So. 2d 876 - Summers v. State

“If such probation is revoked, the court shall adjudge the probationer guilty of the offense charged and proven or admitted, unless he shall have previously been adjudged guilty, and impose any sentence which it might have originally imposed before placing the probationer on probation. (Emphasis supplied).”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including Bilyou v. State, 388 So. 2d 1017 - State v. Segarra

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1978-03-21

How this case has been cited

Cited by 9 later decisions — most recently March 2002

9 state decisions

701978198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Larry S. Weaver, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

¶2Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Richard P. Zaretsky, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

¶3*871 MOORE, Judge.

¶4This is an appeal from a revocation of probation on which appellant was placed subsequent to pleading guilty to a charge of uttering a forged instrument, a third degree felony proscribed by Section 831.02, Florida Statutes (1975). Upon revocation of probation, appellant was sentenced to three years incarceration.

¶5Appellant contends that because the court was limited to a two year maximum sentence under the terms of his negotiated plea that the trial court cannot exceed that sentence upon revocation of probation. The trial court accepted the plea negotiations and, without objection, placed the defendant on probation for a period of three years.

¶6After probation has been revoked, the trial court can "impose any sentence which it might have originally imposed before placing the probationer on probation." Section 948.06(1), Florida Statutes (1975). Appellant contends the plea negotiations were a restriction on this Statute. We disagree.

¶7We hold that after probation has been revoked a trial court is free to impose any sentence up to the maximum sentence for the crime of which the defendant stands convicted. In this case the appellant was convicted of a third degree felony for which the maximum sentence was five years. Section 775.082(3)(d), Florida Statutes (1975).

¶8Accepting appellant's contentions would lead to absurd results. If the original plea negotiations including an understanding that a defendant would be placed on probation, and the court agreed, the court would then be unable to impose any prison sentence in the event probation was subsequently revoked. It cannot be said that the legislature intended to leave society without any recourse against those defendants who receive the benefit of the court's mercy by being placed on probation and, subsequently, violate the terms thereof.

¶9Appellant, having violated the terms of his probation, cannot now be heard to argue that the State is bound by the terms of an agreement which resulted in the initial imposition of probation.

¶10Appellant's remaining point having no merit, the conviction and sentence appealed from is accordingly

¶11AFFIRMED.

¶12ALDERMAN, C.J., and CROSS, J., concur.

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