¶1concurring. I write to emphasize my stice, case should not be interpreted to allow a plaintiff to receive a double recovery under the Arkansas Insurance Guarantee Act. I agree that there is insufficient evidence in the record before us to determine whether it involves a “covered claim” under the Mississippi Insurance Guarantee Act, Miss. Code Ann. § 83-23-101 et seq. (1999) (“MIGA”), and whether the jury award is a double recovery absent a set-off of the amount already collected from various sources.
¶2Double recovery is abhorrent to our laws. See Douglas v. Adams Trucking Co., Inc., 345 Ark. 203, 46 S.W.3d 512 (2001). While there is a need for individuals to be compensated for a loss, there should not be a recovery greater than the loss. This case should not establish a precedent of allowing double recovery of damages under the Arkansas Property and Casualty Insurance Guarantee Act, Ark. Code Ann. § 23-90-101 et seq. (Repl. 2004), because of linguistic similarities to MIGA. I believe that the dicta in Young v. Bailey, 294 Ark. 300, 742 S.W.2d 905 (1988), adequately highlights the problem faced in this case. “Had the case been submitted on interrogatories specifying the damages awarded,” the question of what portion of the award coincided with an amount already paid by the insured “might have been avoided.” Id. In this case, the jury returned a general verdict while there was a previous insurance payment to appellee. Had there been a specific verdict, the question of whether the damages awarded by the jury were meant to include or supplement the amount appellee already received from insurance would have been determined.
¶3For the foregoing reasons, I concur.