¶2 Dana Judd and Gregory Curfman appeal pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing their action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir.2003) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir.2004) (judicial immunity); Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (failure to state a claim). We affirm.
¶3 The district court properly dismissed the claims against the state court judges because they are entitled to absolute immunity for actions undertaken in their judicial capacities. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (barring injunctive relief against a judicial officer “unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”).
¶4 The district court properly dismissed the RICO claim because plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient particularity a pattern of racketeering activity cognizable under the RICO statute. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b); Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F.3d 616, 620 (9th Cir.2004); see also Lancaster Cmty. Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., 940 F.2d 397, 405 (9th Cir.1991) (explaining that Rule 9(b)’s requirements apply to RICO actions alleging the predicate act of mail fraud).
¶5 Appellants’ remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
¶6 AFFIRMED.