State v. Spivey’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

32 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “`presumptive prejudice' does not necessarily indicate a statistical probability of prejudice; it simply marks the point at which courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker enquiry [sic].”

   8 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 251 N.C. App. 610 - State v. Evans · 192 N.C. App. 277 - State v. Washington

2. “We regard none of the four factors identified above as either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant. In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process. But, because we are dealing with a fundamental right of the accused, this process must be carried out with full recognition that the accused's interest in a speedy trial is specifically affirmed in the Constitution.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 192 N.C. App. 277 - State v. Washington · 257 N.C. App. 927 - State v. Wilkerson

3. ““The right to a speedy trial is different from other constitutional rights in that, among other things, deprivation of a speedy trial does not per se prejudice the ability of the accused to defend himself, it is impossible to determine precisely when the right has been denied; it cannot be said precisely how long a delay is too long; there is no fixed point when the accused is put to a choice of either exercising or waiving his right to a speedy trial; and dismissal of the charges is the only possible remedy for denial of the right to a speedy trial.” State v. McKoy, 294 N.C. 134, 140 , 240 S.E.2d 383, 388 (1978). In Barker v. Wingo, the United States Supreme Court identified four factors that “courts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his right” to a speedy trial under the federal Constitution. 407 U.S. 514, 530 , 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 117 (1972). These factors are: (i) the length of delay, (ii) the reason for delay, (Hi) the defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and (iv) whether the defendant suffered prejudice as a result of the delay. Id.; see also State v. Flowers, 347 N.C. 1, 27 , 489 S.E.2d 391, 406 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1135 , 140 L. Ed. 2d 150 (1998). “We follow the same analysis when reviewing such claims under Article I, Section 18 of the North Carolina Constitution.” State v. Grooms, 353 N.C. 50, 62 , 540 S.E.2d 713, 721 (2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 838 , 151 L. Ed. 2d 54 (2001).”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 257 N.C. App. 927 - State v. Wilkerson · 211 N.C. App. 613 - State v. Howell