Scott v. Walker’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

60 federal appellate · 1 district · 6 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 83 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"There are several principles of law that are now clear in this difficult area. The first is that the systematic exclusion of Negroes from juries in judicial districts where Negroes represent a substantial part of the population constitutes a deprivation of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Patton v. State of Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 , 68 S.Ct. 184 , 92 L.Ed. 76 , where the Supreme Court said, `When a jury selection plan, whatever it is, operates in such a way as always to result in the complete and long-continued exclusion of any representative at all from a large group of negroes, or any other racial group, indictments and verdicts returned against them by juries thus selected cannot stand.' 332 U.S. 463, 469 , 68 S.Ct. 184, 187 . The second proposition which is equally clear is that the inclusion of a minimal or token number of Negroes on a jury list does not prevent the systematic exclusion rule from operating, for the Supreme Court has said in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 73 S.Ct. 397 , 97 L.Ed. 469 : `Of course, token summoning of Negroes for jury service does not comply with equal protection, Smith v. [State of] Texas, 311 U.S. 128 , [ 61 S.Ct. 164 , 85 L.Ed. 84 ]. See also United States ex rel. Willie Seals Jr. v. Wiman, 5 Cir., 304 F.2d 53, 67 . A further proposition, not in dispute, is that the Constitution does not require an exact proportion between the percentage of Negroes in the population and the percentage of Negroes on the jury lists, nor do”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 187 So. 2d 840 - Shinall v. State · Billingsley v. Clayton

2. “"* * * we think it unnecessary to remand the case for further consideration by the trial court in light of the fact that the state by its own witnesses had contributed to the clear impression which we now hold that there could not conceivably have been more than one percent of the usual jury list of the Negro race. In light of the disparity between this and the 13 percent of the Negro population of the Parish, there was a strong presumption that there was a systematic exclusion within the legal understanding of these terms. Thus the burden was on the state to produce such evidence as was available to it by taking the jury lists and making proof as to the racial identity of the members. Instead, it will be noted that in the direct examinatioin of each of the members of the commission who testified on behalf of the state, no one of them was asked by the attorney for the appellee how many or what percent of the members of any of the lists were members of the Negro race. The state's efforts consisted almost solely in obtaining the conclusionary response to the question whether the commissioners participated in any plan or scheme to exclude Negroes on account of race. These answers could honestly be given by persons who had, nevertheless, by their conduct produced the result, even through no illegal or evil motive or absence of good faith, that the Constitution outlaws. See United States ex rel. Seals v. Wiman, supra, 304 F.2d page 65. "While it may be unfortunate that there is no”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Williams v. State · 187 So. 2d 840 - Shinall v. State

3. “* * * that the district judge shall have discretion to decide upon the competency of jurors in particular cases where from physical infirmity or from relationship, or other causes, the person may be, in the opinion of the judge, incompetent to sit upon the trial of any particular case.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Labat v. Bennett